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Hungarian self-defense movements emerged in the context of a steady growth in 
and acceptance of far-right ideas and practices.1 Currently, the Movement for a Better 
Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom, JOBBIK), a legal right-wing political 
party, is leading the charge in the growing popularity of right-wing groups.  
The nationalistic ideology of the extreme right-wing groups reflect the socio-
political and economic instability that has plagued Hungary since it emerged from the 
Hungarian Kingdom after the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. Hungary lost more than two-thirds 
of its land and one-third of its people to Czechoslovakia, Romania, Russia, and 
Yugoslavia.2 The desire to regain the land and reunite Hungary is essential to the far-
right’s rhetoric.   
In the 1990s, Hungary emerged from 46 years of Soviet rule and rapidly gained 
ground as a free-market economy. Hungary also joined NATO in 1999 and by 2001 
extended temporary work, education, and health-care rights (via the Status Law) to 
Hungarians living in surrounding countries. In 2002 the European Union formally 
extended the invitation to Hungary to join the EU in 2004. The country’s financial 
situation began to weaken due to high levels of private and state borrowing. Financially, 
Hungary was dangerously vulnerable to the looming global financial crisis. 
The global financial crisis took its toll on Hungary, creating the worst recession in 
its history. In 2008 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European World Bank 
granted Hungary a rescue package. By 2009, Hungary and Russia had signed an 
agreement to partner on the Hungarian transport and storage of Russian gas supplies. 
That same year Hungary passed a financial austerity package of spending cuts, tax 
increases, and a wage freeze.  
In 2011, the Hungarian parliament passed a controversial new election law that 
halved the number of Members of Parliament and redrew their electoral boundaries. In 
                                                 
1 Manuel Mireanu, “The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary 
Groups,” Fascism 2, no. 1 (2013): 68–93. 
2 BBC News. “Hungary Profile,” March 2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17383522. 
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addition, parliament passed a controversial law on central bank reform giving the 
government increased control over monetary policy, causing the European Central Bank 
to raise concern.   
In 2012, Hungary’s Value-added Tax (VAT) increased to 27%—the highest rate 
in the EU—and the Parliament initiated a new constitution which resulted in public-wide 
demonstrations and rioting. Its financial ills continued with a downgrading of its credit 
rating to junk status. The EU then suspended payment to Hungary. By the end of the year 
Hungary was in a financial standoff with the IMF and political factions were 
maneuvering into hardline positions. During the April 2014 national elections, Hungary 
began moving to the right. 
This movement to the right had been occurring over a number of years. It picked 
up momentum in 1993, when the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP) was founded. 
As the first legal and far-right nationalist political party in Hungary, it won 5.5% of the 
votes and it gained parliamentary representation with 14 seats at the legislative elections 
in 1998. When it did not get into the national parliament in 2001, its members merged 
into the JOBBIK party that was established in the same year.3 
JOBBIK describes itself as “a principled, conservative, and radically patriotic 
Christian party” whose “fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and 
interests.”4 It calls itself “the only party to face one of the underlying problems of 
Hungarian society—the unsolved situation of the ever growing gypsy population, which 
constitutes about 7% of the population.5 According to its platform, its focus is on “gypsy 
crime,” a phenomenon that “everyone knows” but is silenced by “political correctness.”6  
                                                 
3 Jobbik.hu. “Miért Alakult Meg A Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom-Párt,” [Why was the 
Movement for a Better Hungary-Party founded] Jun 2008, 
http://zuglo.jobbik.hu/miert_alakult_meg_a_jobbik_magyarorszagert_mozgalom_part. 
4 Jobbik.com. “A Short Summary about Jobbik,” May 2010, 
http://www.jobbik.com/short_summary_about_jobbik. 
5 The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reported that the condition of the country’s “Roma 
minority has come under the spotlight in recent years. The Roma community is blighted by poverty and 
illiteracy, with many Roma living on the margins of Hungarian society, often victims of discrimination. 
6 Jobbik.com. “A Short Summary about Jobbik,” May 2010, 
http://www.jobbik.com/short_summary_about_jobbik 
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Hungary’s history, as well as its political and economic unrest, appears to have 
generated anxiety among the population that has fueled extreme right-wing ideologies. 
The higher crime rate typical of underdeveloped, Roma-inhabited regions has specifically 
provoked right-wing rhetoric and has attracted political support to counter ‘gypsy-
crime.,78 The well-known 2006 speech of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Ferenc 
Gyurcsány, appears to have triggered riots and violent protests that year. He admits on a 
confidential, but taped, meeting that his party lied to the public in order to win the general 
election.9 
In the years that followed, the hyper-nationalist and anti-Semitic feelings were 
transformed from rhetoric to direct actions.10 In the spring of 2008, the Hungarian 
Guard’s patrolling of the streets of Nyírkáta, with the explicit aim of stopping ‘gypsy 
crime,’ drew wide media attention to the Hungarian civilian self-defense organizations. 
JOBBIK’s support for the self-defense cause triggered an avalanche of self-organizing 
group formation.11 Similar self-defense organizations began appearing all over the 
country.12 “The events culminated in April 2011 with a crisis in the village of 
Gyöngyöspata,13 where several patrols had been active.”14 The provocative language of 
                                                 
7 Analysts have described far-right extremist groups and organizations as holding concrete anti-Roma 
goals in Hungary. 
8 Jennifer Leaning, Jacqueline Bhabha, Arlan Fuller, Margareta Matache, Bonnie Shnayerson, Carrie 
Bronsther, Jelena Ivanis, and Katalin Dobias, Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungar,. 
FXB Center for Health & Human Rights, Harvard University (Boston, February 2014), 8, 
http://fxb.harvard.edu/report-growing-patterns-violence-roma-hungary-sound-alarms/. 
9 BBC News, “Europe, Excerpts: Hungarian ‘Lies’ Speech.” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/5359546.stm. 
10 Manuel Mireanu, “The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary 
Groups,” 68–93. 
11 Damon L. Smith, “Jobbik: A Better Hungary at the Cost of Europe” (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2014). 
12 However, several months after the Guard was created, a Hungarian news agency reported that 
“three founding members of the radical right-wing JOBBIK party, including former chairman Dávid 
Kovács, had left the party, declaring that it has become too radical. He issued a statement that “JOBBIK 
has been merged inseparably with the Guard, taking responsibility for something that it cannot really 
control in the long run.” As a result, the leaders of the Guard gradually turn against the JOBBIK which later 
led to a split within the organization.  
13 For a Better Future Hungarian Self Defense began to patrol in the village because of the 
increasingly frequent crime which blamed on the Romas. The tension between the two sides was dependent 
at least 1 to 2 months during which time more fighting occurred between the two parties. 
14 Manuel Mireanu, “The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary 
Groups,” 68–93. 
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Zsolt Tyirityán, leader of the Betyársereg (Outlaw’s Army), exemplified the heated 
rhetoric when he called on Hungarians to, “stop being the prey and start being 
predators.”15 Subsequent to these and other events, the European Roma Right Centre 
released a report detailing 61 separate violent acts against Romas between January 2008 
and September 2012, some of which involved discharged weapons, Molotov cocktails, 
and even hand grenades.16 
Hungarian sentiment continued its political shift to the right in 2010. JOBBIK 
was able to win 47 seats in the national election, completely removing the Alliance of 
Free Democrats—the Hungarian Liberal Party (SZDSZ)—from government. Meanwhile, 
the majority Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Alliance) party 
was enacting right-leaning changes to the law and constitution. Simultaneously, JOBBIK 
secured three seats in the European Parliament elections, marking the first time a far-
right-wing party held a representative government position abroad since the end of the 
World War II. 
A. PURPOSE AND RESEARCH GOAL 
The main purpose of this study is to assist the Hungarian Government with 
illuminating the network of extreme right-wing self-defense organizations in Hungary. 
Although addressed from the military and unconventional warfare perspective, this study 
describes and analyzes groups based on their participation in offensive or paramilitary 
actions, including hate-rallies, demonstrations, security patrols or ‘show the force,’ and 
military training. Beyond descriptive analyses, the secondary purpose is to identify 
possible strategic options to deal with this network. Thus, this research focuses on two 
primary questions: what does the network of right-wing self-defense organizations look 
like, and what options does the Hungarian government have to deal with them? 
                                                 
15 Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Gyűlöletcsoport Térkép,” [Athena Institute – Hate groups map] 
July 2014, http://www.athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/. 
16 Catherine Twigg, Attacks against Roma in Hungary: January 2008–September 2012 (European 
Roma Rights Centre, Budapest, October 1, 2012). http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/attacks-list-in-
hungary.pdf. 
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B. THESIS STRUCTURE: 
The reminder of this study is organized as follows: Chapter II (Literature Review) 
provides an overview of Hungarian extreme far-right organizations involved in self-
defense activities. This section focuses on the network’s current activities along with the 
organizational and ideological foundations of the groups. Chapter III (Research 
Methodology) describes the analytical methods used to examine the research questions 
outlined in Chapter II, and provides a description of the sources from which the data were 
collected and structured. Chapter IV (Data Analysis and Results), the backbone of this 
study, provides an exploratory analysis of the network using several analytical 
techniques, namely relational, geospatial, and temporal analyses. Chapter V (Discussion) 
will first list identified patterns of the network, and subsequently put them into context. 
The next section of this chapter (Strategic Options) will then list and evaluate several 
strategic options based on the analytical results. Based on the current situation and the 
legal framework of Hungary, Chapter VI (Conclusion) recommends the most effective 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
The 2008 annual report of Constitution Protection Office (AH), formerly known 
as Office of National Security (NBH), states that the importance of the extreme right in 
Hungary should not be overestimated. According to the official statement, right-wing 
movements are divided and only have a small mass base of support, mostly because 
“their self-appointed leaders are not capable of developing a common position beyond 
their individual interests.”17 The report also highlights that the riots associated with the 
radical right-wing groups have recently become more violent than in previous years and 
pose a physical threat to their political opponents. This chapter summarizes the various 
groups, their ideology, tactics, and goals. 
A. EXTREME RIGHT-WING SELF-DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS IN 
HUNGARY 
The Hungarian and the Western European press described the extreme right-wing 
self-defense groups as paramilitary organization, civilian militia or party militia.18  Joint 
Publication 1–02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated 
Terms,” defines paramilitary forces as “forces or groups distinct from the regular armed 
forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or 
mission.”19 From a military point of view, Mazzei’s definition better characterizes the 
Hungarian self-defense organizations. According to her, “paramilitary groups are 
political, armed organizations that are by definition extra-military, extra-State, non-
institutional entities, but which mobilize and operate with the assistance of important 
allies, including factions within the State.”20 In the case of Hungary, these groups are 
                                                 
17 Origo.hu. “Nem Kell Túlbecsülni a Szélsőjobbot Az NBH Szerint,” [According to the NBH, the 
extreme right in Hungary should not be overestimated] April 2009, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20090415-
a-nemzetbiztonsagi-hivatal-nbh-2008as-evkonyve-tevekenysegerol.html#. 
18 Inside Europe—Deutsche Welle. “Hungarian neo-fascist paramilitary group expands,” accessed: 
March 28, 2014. http://www.dw.de/dw/article/0,,3752785,00.html. 
19 Richard A. Best Jr. and Andrew Feickert. “Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary 
Operations: Issues for Congress.” CRS Report for Congress, Order Code RS22017 (December 6, 2006). 
doi: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RS22017.pdf. 
20 Julie Mazzei, Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?: How Paramilitary Groups Emerge and 
Challenge Democracy in Latin America (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 2009), 4. 
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offensive and in many cases violent, but they have to reject arming openly because of the 
current security and legal environment.  
The dissolution of the first Hungarian Guard in 2009 was due to their 
demonstrations and events against ‘Gipsy-crime’ that turned discrimination into their 
political agenda. According to the Metropolitan Court, the group’s use of fear to 
intimidate others was not acceptable.21 According to Domina Kristóf, of the Athene 
Institute, an independent human-rights group based in Budapest, these right-wing 
organizations now “deny any connection to hate crimes or other offenses. They (have) 
learned their lesson from the banning of the Hungarian Guard, […] (and) are very careful 
not to be involved [in any criminal activity] as an organization.”22 The efforts of right-
wing self-defense organizations appear to strategically adapt to public and legal 
acceptance regarding paramilitarism. 
Although Hungarian groups do not perfectly fit the definitions above, they can be 
safely considered paramilitary organizations because their activities are clearly directed 
against a definite group of people who are perceived as threatening the socioeconomic 
basis of the desired political order,23 and in addition, their activities clearly include 
paramilitary features such as military type trainings, security patrolling, and wearing 
uniforms. 
1. Ideological Basis 
Paramilitary activities have been characteristic of the Hungarian far-right in the 
past. As Bodó points out, paramilitary violence based on both extreme left and right 
ideologies (the period of Red and White Terror) helped shape Hungary after the Great 
War.24 After the end of the Second World War and the fall of Nazi domination, the 
                                                 
21 Politics.hu. “Court Dissolves Hungarian Guard, Claiming Right-Wing Group Insults Roma 
Minority,” December 2008, http://www.politics.hu/20081217/court-dissolves-hungarian-guard-claiming-
rightwing-group-insults-roma-minority/. 
22 Sonni Efron and Tad Stahnke, We’re Not Nazis, but... - The Rise of Hate Parties in Hungary and 
Greece and Why America Should Care (Human Rights First, New York, August 14, 2014), 58. 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-report-We-Are-Not-Nazis-But.pdf  
23 Mazzei, Death Squads or Self-Defense Forces?, 4–5. 
24 Bodó Béla, “Pál Prónay: Paramilitary Violence and Anti-Semitism in Hungary, 1919–1921.” The 
Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East European Studies, no. 2101 (December 21, 2011): 2. doi: 
http://carlbeckpapers.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/cbp/article/view/167.  
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Communists established their military wing again under the name of Youth Defense 
Guard (Ifjú Gárda). It was similar to the later Workers’ Guard (Munkásőrség), which was 
created and trained to defend the Single Party’s regime after the revolution in 1956.25  
Because real political opposition could not exist under communism, right-wing 
extremism was able to re-emerge only in the 1990s. Until the 2006 riots, their messages 
generally focused on “ideas of national redemption, with rare outbursts of anti-Semitism 
and […] accusations against the current political elite.”26 These ideologies triggered 
violence only occasionally, and in isolated cases. In the following years, direct actions 
became a practice built around hyper-nationalist and anti-semitic, or more frequently, 
anti-Roma (racist) ideas.27  
Today, Hungary has three main types of right wing radicalism: the Skinhead or 
neo-Nazi; the Hungarist; and the New-Radical right-wing. Despite adhering to right-wing 
political views, these organizations are not monolithic. Conflict between the New-Radical 
right and the Hungarists has been intensifying since the mid-1990s.28 For instance, the 
national radicals idealize the ‘Horthy era,’29 while the Hungarists characterize Horthy as 
a supporter of the Jews, which is against right-wing beliefs. They also have differences in 
their rhetoric. For example, in contrast to the Hungarists, the New-Radical refrain from 
anti-democratic or anti-regime statements in the mainstream media and only use this 
rhetoric in front of far-right-wing audience.30 Moreover, the two parties publicly reject 
collusion with the other, although they both target specific minorities, primarily the Roma 
and Jewish people,31 which is a crucial element of their ideologies. 
                                                 
25 Manuel Mireanu, “The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary 
Groups,” 71. 
26 Manuel Mireanu, “The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary 
Groups,” 73. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Tóth Ferenc, Voltunk, Vagyunk, Leszünk? “ Hungaristák” Jelenkori Vetületei [We were, we are, we 
will be? Contemporary projections of the Hungarists] (Országos Tudományos Diákköri Tanács, 
Társadalomtudományi Szekció, Zsigmond Király Főiskola, Budapest, 2011): 6–8. doi: 
http://otdk.zskf.hu/Dolgozatok/225.pdf  
29 Vitéz Horthy Miklós was a Hungarian Admiral and statesman who served as Regent of the 
Kingdom of Hungary during most of the inter war era and World War II. 
30 Tóth Ferenc, Voltunk, Vagyunk, Leszünk?, 6–8. 
31 Ibid. 
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These groups largely share negative views of the Hungarian Defense Forces 
(HDF). After the break-up of the Warsaw-Pact, the government suspended the army’s 
conscription system and significantly reduced it in size. These changes, which were 
brought on by the country’s tough financial situation under left wing and liberal 
governments, resulted in a noticeable reduction in the country’s military capabilities. This 
trend ultimately changed role of the HDF into a weaker organization that relies greatly on 
external support from organizations such as NATO. Today, because of its weaker role 
and its reliance on external support, most extremist groups refer to the current HDF as a 
mercenary army used to support the interests of Jewish conspiracy instead of homeland 
security. Additionally, they claim the reserve force is just a scam.32 These positions 
appeal to the younger generation that is often attracted to masculine militarist challenges 
which are championed among these self-defense groups. 
The Hungarian far-right distinguishes itself from other European new radical 
parties because it has its own paramilitary force, for instance the Hungarian Guard.33 The 
Guard was formed in 2007 through an ‘oath of allegiance’ taken by men and women 
wearing black uniforms bearing the ultra-nationalist symbols made famous in the 2006 
riots.34 Samu Tamás Gergő, president of the Békés County JOBBIK organization 
announced in 2009: “If the JOBBIK gains power … the members of the Guard will form 
the backbone of the [new] Hungarian gendarmerie, will be invested with public authority, 
and will march here, … with weapons on their side.”35 With its inception, the Guard 
brought on a modern form of far-right paramilitarism that seeks and is able to garner 
public support. As Mirenau summarized in 2014, 
The need for such a group was clearly articulated upon a perceived deficit 
of security, and the Guard was supposed to fill that gap by tackling threats 
to national security. Yet, this gap was perceived not only as a capability 
                                                 
32 jövőnk.info. “A Tartalékos Haderő Is Átverés?” [Is the reserve force just a scum?] December 2010, 
http://www.jovonk.info/2010/12/22/tartalekos-hadero-atveres. 
33 Damon L. Smith, “Jobbik: A Better Hungary at the Cost of Europe” (Master’s Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2014). 
34 Manuel Mireanu, “The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary 
Groups,” 74. 
35 BEOL.hu. “Tüntetés Sarkadon: fegyvert adna a Gárdának a Jobbik,” [Demonstartion on Sarkad: the 
Jobbik would give weapons to the Garda] March 2009, http://www.beol.hu/bekes/kozelet/tuntetes-
sarkadon-fegyvert-adna-a-gardanak-a-jobbik-215811. 
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gap, but also as a moral and ideological one. The Hungarian Guard uttered 
a discourse of historical decadence, whereby internal and external enemies 
threaten the daily wellbeing of ethnic Hungarians everywhere.36  
Thus, self-defense and paramilitarism can be understood as a vital part of the 
right-wing groups. It is built on the protection of its own ethnic community against aliens 
and/or minorities.37 Anti-elite views and Euro-skepticism are general features of the self-
defense movements as well, primarily because of their attention in mainstream media and 
the protection of rights of self-determination.38 As Bíró and Róna noted (2011), the 
expropriation of the ‘Gipsy-crime’ topic was the cause of the sharp increase in the far-
right’s popularity in Hungary from 2009.39 The Garda Movement, and the other 
cooperative or rival paramilitary organizations, has succeeded in convincing a significant 
part of the public that their activities are not aimed at the fueling of the ethnic tensions 
but meeting the country’s existing needs.40 As a result, they were able to operate and gain 
popularity under the left- as well as right-wing governments.41 
                                                 
36 Manuel Mireanu, “The Spectacle of Security in the Case of Hungarian Far-Right Paramilitary 
Groups,” 75. 
37 Szombati Kristóf and Feischmidt Margit, Gyöngyöspata 2011. A Magyarországi Szélsőjobboldal 
Laboratóriuma - A Politikai Mozgósítás és az Interetnikus Konfliktus Elemzése és Tanulságai 
[Gyöngyöspata 2011. The laboratory of the Hungarian far-right—Political mobilizationand the interethnic 
conflict analysis and lessons] (Ökopolisz Alapítvány, Budapest, 2012): 7. 
http://www.okopolisz.eu/uploads/Csatolmanyok/okp_gy_2011_tanulmany_final_0416.pdf. 
38 Szombati Kristóf, Feischmidt Margit, Gyöngyöspata 2011, 8. 
39 Bíró Nagy András, Róna Dániel, Tudatos Radikalizmus - A Jobbik Útja a Parlamentbe, 2003–2010 
[Conscious radicalism—The Jobbik’s path into the Parliament, 2003–2010] (Policy Solutions, Budapest, 
2011): 36–37. http://www.policysolutions.hu/userfiles/file/B%C3%ADr%C3%B3%20Nagy-
R%C3%B3na_Tudatos%20radikalizmus_v%C3%A9gs%C5%91.pdf. 




Figure 1.  JOBBIK’s Protest in Kerecsend October 2012. The events were 
triggered by an attack on local elderly couple. The banner reads: “Stop 
the Gypsy Crime” (from alfahir.hu, 2012)42 
To summarize, in the case of self-defense, the boundaries are blurred between the 
far-right political views. The main difference remains only the level of rejection of the 
current legal social structure.43 Building on the summary above and the typology of 
Political Capital,44 a Hungarian policy research and consulting institute, the following 
chart (Table 1) classifies the most important Hungarian far-right organizations involved 
in self-defense or paramilitary activities.45 The less significant skinhead organizations—
the Hungaria Skins or Skins4skins—are considered as one group due to their relatively 
small size, inconsistent positions, and a lack of sources. The ‘relationship with 
democratic institutions’ column describes the level of rejection of the current legal social 
structure in the case of each group. The ‘public relations’ column refers the public 
transparency and the openness of the groups.  
                                                 
42 Alfahir.hu. “kerecsend_1.jpg (JPEG Image, 550 × 367 Pixels) - Scaled (0%),” October 2012, 
http://alfahir.hu/sites/barikad.hu/files/2012/10/kerecsend_1.jpg 
43 Tóth Ferenc, We were, we are, we will be?, 8. 
44 Gimes Gergely, Somogyi Zoltán, Krekó Péter, Kiss Kálmán, and Juhász Attila, Látlelet 2008 
[Report 2008] (Political Capital, Budapest, 2008): 66. 
http://www.euroastra.info/files/20081016_eloiteletesseg_tanulmany_081016.pdf.  
45 Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Gyűlöletcsoport Térkép,” [Athena Institute – Hate groups map] 
July 2014, http://www.athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/. 
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Table 1.   Hungarian Far-Right Organizations Involved In Self-Defense or Paramilitary Activities. 
Name Used in 
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There are other issues of concern regarding the ideological bases of self-defense 
groups. Political analysts have noted that the majority of the far-right parties all over the 
EU, including the Hungarian New-Radicals as well as the Hungarists are pro-Russian,46 
without any historical or ideological ties to Hungarian nationalism. Moreover, earlier in 
this year, one of JOBBIK’s members in the European Parliament, Kovács Béla was 
suspected of spying for Russia.47 The latest issue arose when Moscow accused Hungary 
of supplying Ukraine with arms based on the bulletin of a relatively unknown Hungarian 
far-right news portal (www.hidfo.net). These events suggest a Russian policy that aims to 
develop or support European extremist groups to undermine the EU and NATO from 
within. 
2. Organizational Basis 
The self-defense/paramilitary activities are typically carried out within the legal 
framework of political movements. For example, members of the Hungarian Guard, who 
were disbanded by the Metropolitan Court for the violations of the law of assembly in 
2009, founded a new and legal movement known as the New Hungarian Guard 
Movement.48 The Blood and Honor Cultural Association, which was disbanded in 2005, 
followed a similar legal process by re-establishing itself as a movement under the name 
of Pax Hungarica. By establishing themselves as legal movements, instead of association 
or party that can be banned, they can continue to take advantage of the benefits that such 
bodies can receive.49 According to the Athena Institute, most of the far-right movements 
in Hungary have bank accounts for fundraising, and can even receive one percent of 
personal income tax as social organizations.50  
                                                 
46 Sonni Efron and Tad Stahnke. We’re Not Nazis, but, 32. 
47 Origo.hu. “Kémkedéssel Gyanúsítják a Jobbik Jelöltjét,” [The Jobbik’s candidate is suspected of 
spying for Russia] May 2014, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140515-kemkedessel-gyanusitjak-a-jobbik-
jeloltjet-kovacs-belat.html. 
48 Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Nulla Pénzből Gazdálkodik a Magyar Extrémizmus,” [Athena 





In terms of their paramilitary activities, such as military trainings, these groups 
maintain their ability to act mainly through supporter contributions and volunteer work.51 
The costs appear to be minimal- given their three-day-long training camps for the 
participants,52 usually less than 2000 HUF (approximately 8 USD). In comparison, the 
price of an ‘Airsoft’ war game is 17.500 HUF (72 USD).53 A five-day-long military-type 
team-building training organized by a civilian company costs 39.000 HUF (161 USD).54 
Thus, the far-right groups have been able to find ways to support themselves even though 
many of them have been legally dissolved at one point. 
The size of each right-wing group is unclear. Hungarian mass media has provided 
several conflicting reports regarding the size of the groups and their supporters; however, 
no comprehensive study has been conducted. According the Athena Institute, the 
Hungarian Guard alone contained approximately 700 active members at the peak of its 
popularity.55 In the case of the remaining self-defense organizations, the average number 
appears to be about one hundred active members.56 Part of the difficulty with 
determining the size of each group, is that the right-wing groups often collaborate and 
share members. The Outlaws’ Army is one example of a group whose members are often 
associated with other groups. For example, their leader was a member of the Hungarian 
National Front as well as Blood and Honor.57 According to several testimonies, the 
group’s webpage is also maintained by the same person who was involved in the military 
training of The Arrows of the Hungarians. A more common example mentioned in the 
mass media is that of Zagyva György Gyula, who is parliamentarian of the JOBBIK and 
                                                 
51 Ibid. 
52 Hvg.hu. “Itthon: ‘Katonai Kiképzést Kaptunk’ - Interjú a Nemzeti Arcvonal-Tábor Egyik 
Résztvevőjével,” [We received military training—Interview with a participant of the National Front’s 
Camp] March 2011, http://hvg.hu/itthon/20110319_magyar_nemzeti_arcvonal_kikepzes. 
53 DevGru. “Bombák Földje 6 Előzetes I.rész,” [Land of bombs 6—review] 
http://www.devgru.hu/?p=4321. 
54 Elite Challenge. “Elite Challenge GY.I.K.,” [Elite Challenge  FAQ] 
http://www.elitechallenge.hu/index.php?q=gyik. 
55 Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Gyűlöletcsoport Térkép,” [Athena Institute – Hate groups map] 
July 2014, http://www.athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Nulla Pénzből Gazdálkodik a Magyar Extrémizmus,” [Athena 
Institute—The Hungarian extremism operates by zero money] July 2007. 
http://www.athenaintezet.hu/fokuszban/olvas/9. 
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the former chairman of the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, but who is also a 
member of the Outlaws’ Army.58 
3. Activities 
Military action conducted outside of the state’s formal armed forces, as well as 
trainings organized by self-defense organizations can be considered paramilitary 
activities. As seen in Table 1 in Section 1, over a dozen right-wing groups exist in 
Hungary that can be considered paramilitary organizations. A description of each group’s 
paramilitary activities is beyond the purpose of this chapter. Instead, this section will 
describe these groups’ activities largely through the most typical examples, which best 
represents the activities of Hungarian right-wing groups in general.   
Regarding the military-type trainings, the Hungarian National Front has the most 
media coverage compared with the rest of the groups. According to the Athena Institute, 
the Hungarian National Front has been one of the oldest and most organized self-defense 
groups in Hungary. Their founder “claims to have revived the movement under the name 
Hungarian National Socialist Task Force back in 1989 answering a call from WWII 
fascist leaders exiled during the Communist regime.”59 Their ‘action groups’ have been 
trained for actual armed combat. On their website (http://www.jovonk.info), they 
regularly publish propaganda materials and reports about their training events and 
capabilities. Paramilitary events are held all year long to educate and train the members. 
The paramilitary training seems to be a multistage process led by organizers with police 
or military experience. The basic trainings are conducted over three-day-long ‘open 
camps.’60 These ‘open camps’ are partially public events for external volunteers, and 
according to witness reports, their primary focus is military training. The candidates 
receive close combat, basic weapon drills, small unit tactics, as well as psychological 
training. Ideology does not appear to play an important role in these events. 
                                                 
58 Ibid. 
59 Athena Institute. “Athena Institute - Gyűlöletcsoport Térkép,” [Athena Institute – Hate groups map] 
July 2014, http://www.athenaintezet.hu/gyuloletcsoportok/. 
60 Angyal Gábor, “Belföld - Vizsgálják a Bőnyi Neonáci Kiképzőtábor Ügyét,” [Domestic—The 
Bőny neo-Nazi training camp is under investigation] NOL.hu, September 2009, 
http://nol.hu/belfold/vizsgaljak_a_neonaci_kikepzotabort-348514. 
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In the next stage of training, only the members can participate in special 
preparations like land navigation, night-fighting, medical training, and urban combat. The 
acquired knowledge and capabilities are periodically tested on complex exercises. In one 
such event, the members of an elite ‘action team,’ located all around the country, have to 
capture or kill a fictional high-value target (referred to ‘the enemy of the people’) on a 
particular and fortified location guarded by a ‘security unit.’ The elite ‘action team’ must 
be able to covertly approach a target building and conduct a hit against an opposing force. 
After the execution of the exercise, the members leave the target area individually.61   
 
Figure 2.  ‘Action Teams’ in the ‘Open Camps.’ Urban warfare (left) medical 
(middle) and close quarter combat (right) training with simulation guns 
held by the Hungarian National Front (from jovonk.info, 2013),6263 
The members of Hungarian National Front, and many of the other groups, also 
participate in long-range road marches. These activities are connected to historical events 
and guided by popular nationalist ideals. For example, in the ‘Outbreak Memorial Tour’ 
(Kitörés Emléktúra) or ‘Attila Defense Line Tour’ (Attila-Védvonal Túra), both of which 
are memorials to German and Hungarian defenders of the ‘Fort of Budapest’ in the 
                                                 
61 Szabad Riport. “Ez Még Csak Gyakorlat: A Belső Ellenség Felszámolása,” [It is still only a 
training: Elimination of the internal enemy] November 2011, 
http://szabadriport.wordpress.com/2011/11/29/ez-meg-csak-gyakorlat-a-belso-ellenseg-felszamolasa/. 
62 Jövőnk.info. “2011-08-31-Helyi-Csoportok-Kepzese-folytatodik1.jpg (JPEG Image, 500 × 375 
Pixels) - Scaled (0%),” August 2011, http://www.jovonk.info/sites/default/files/kepek/hir/2011-08-31-
helyi-csoportok-kepzese-folytatodik1.jpg. 
63 Jövőnk.info. “16-Ero-Es-batorsag2.jpg (JPEG Image, 640 × 480 Pixels),” December 2013, 
http://www.jovonk.info/sites/default/files/kepek/2013/12/16-ero-es-batorsag2.jpg 
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Second World War, most of the prominent Hungarian far-right stakeholders participates, 
including the JOBBIK itself.,6465 
As was mentioned above, paramilitary training does not always popularize the 
ideology. The theoretical and practical trainings often take place separately. While the 
Hungarists organize open ‘culture nights’ on permanent locations, some of the New-
Radicals initiate cross-country journeys and hold a series of lectures often combined with 
recruitment. These events are mainly political/ideological, for instance ‘Hungarian 
Resistance Academy’ (Magyar Ellenállás Akadémia), but topics like guerilla warfare, 
legal limits of underground activities, and asymmetric warfare can be found too.,6667 
Sometimes the speakers illustrate their lectures with combat footages about the most 
recent war in Iraq and Afghanistan.68 
The training of the self-defense movements is not the only activity to receive 
publicity. Activities demonstrating strength are also prominent activities that gain public 
awareness. The new Guards and other local vigilante organizations still conduct security 
patrols concentrating on “rural areas with threatened public order and public safety.”69 
These places are usually densely populated by Romas so carrying out ‘show the force’ 
systematically creates a threatening atmosphere without actual attacks against the 
                                                 
64 Kuruc.info. “A Híresztelések Ellenére Nem Maradt El: Kitörés-Emléktúra Az Óbudai Jobbikkal,” 
[Despite the rumors, the Outbreak memorial tour was held by the Jobbik] February 2014. 
http://kuruc.info/r/23/122644/. 
65 Szent Korona Rádió. “Együtt Tiszteleg a Nemzeti Oldal: Attila-Védvonal Túra Október 19-Én,” 
[The national side is saluting together: Attil defense line tour] August 2013, 
http://szentkoronaradio.com/20130828/egyutt-tiszteleg-nemzeti-oldal-attila-vedvonal-tura-oktober-19-en. 
66 Betyársereg. “‘Eltakarítottuk Pécsről a Kommunista Söpredéket’ (+videó),” [Pécs was cleared away 
the Communist scum] February 2014, http://betyarsereg.hu/eltakaritottuk-pecsrol-a-kommunista-
sopredeket-video/. 
67 Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom. “Lezajlott Az Első Magyar Ellenállás Akadémia,” [The 
first Hungarian Resistance Academy] January 2010, http://www.hvim.hu/akademia. 
68 Betyársereg. “A Mélységi Felderítőktől a Jobbikig – Ismét Kever-Kavar Az ATV (+videó),” [From 
the long-range reconnaissance to Jobbik—The ATV massed up again] February 2014, 
http://betyarsereg.hu/a-melysegi-felderitoktol-a-jobbikig-ismet-kever-kavar-az-atv-video/. 
69 Polgár Info. “Nyírkátán Demonstrál a Jobbik, a Gárda És Az Õrsereg,” [The Jobbik, the Guard and 
the National Protection Force demonstrate on Nyírkáta] April 2008, 
http://www.polgarinfo.hu/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=20133. 
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community. As an example, the old Hungarian Guard conducted hundreds of these 
patrols from 2007 December till 2009 February.70 
 
Figure 3.  Security Patrol. Show of force front of a Roma family by members 
of For Better Future Hungarian Self Defense movement in 
Gyönygyöspata (from origo.hu, 2011)71 
These events usually take place in the form of unarmed marching in formation or 
patrolling in small teams, see on Figure 3. They usually start with public speeches about 
the importance of taking actions against the ‘Gipsy crime’ phenomenon. Participants in 
these events typically refrain from physical violence mostly because of ideological and 
legal considerations. As LeBor (2014) summarizes in his work, the Guard tries to 
maintain that they are a positive force and not involved in any criminal activity. This 
stance also helps to sustain the legitimacy of its parental organization—JOBBIK.72  
                                                 
70 Szombati Kristóf, Feischmidt Margit, Gyöngyöspata 2011, 10. 
71 Origo.hu. “20110311gyongyosp5.jpg (JPEG Image, 640 × 426 Pixels) - Scaled (0%),” March 2011, 
http://rewrite.origos.hu/s/img/i/1103/20110311gyongyosp5.jpg 
72 Adam LeBOr, “Marching Back to the Future: Magyar Garda and the Resurgence of the Right in 




Only a small portion of the actual groups, such as the Outlaws’ Army, believe in 
actually using violence to achieve their goals.73 Interestingly, they often boast about these 
actions openly on their webpage although they typically “sanitize” their message to avoid 
legal consequences. For instance, they published information and images about an attack 
conducted against a liberal radio station in 2009 (see Figure 4).74   
 
Figure 4.  Members of the Outlaws’ Army (from betyarsereg.hu, 2013)75 
As seen above in Figure 4, some self-defense groups also effectively use social 
media platforms as ways to spread propaganda. Most of the teams have webpages and 
Facebook profiles such as www.hvim.hu or www.betyarsereg.hu. In addition, a variety of 
both New-Radical and Hungarist news portals exist, for instance webpages such as 
http://kuruc.info/, http://kitartas.net/ or http://alfahir.hu/node. The quality of the digital 
products also has become better and more sophisticated over time. They regularly use the 
Internet to organize events like demonstrations or training camps; however, they often 
                                                 
73 Jennifer Leaning, Jacqueline Bhabha, Arlan Fuller, Margareta Matache, Bonnie Shnayerson, Carrie 
Bronsther, Jelena Ivanis and Katalin Dobias, Accelerating Patterns of Anti-Roma Violence in Hungary, 25. 
74 Betyársereg. “Betyártámadás: 2009-Ben Élőben Csaptak Oda a Harcosok,” [Outlaw attack: the 
warriors strikes live in 2009] March 2011, http://betyarsereg.hu/betyartamadas-2009-ben-eloben-csaptak-
oda-harcosok/. 
75 Betyársereg. “betyarok2.jpg (JPEG Image, 1024 × 682 Pixels) - Scaled (0%),” March 2013, 
http://betyarsereg.hu/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/betyarok2.jpg. 
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leave out key details to the wider public, such as the exact place or time, in order to 
maintain secrecy. In fact, most of the participants are informed personally via the groups’ 
personal offline networks.  
There are other issues of concern regarding the activities of self-defense groups. 
Some of the prominent organizations, for instance the Sixty-four Counties Youth 
Movement, are attempting to mobilize ethnic Hungarian in neighboring countries.76 As a 
result, the Hungarian self-defense movement cannot be considered only as a domestic 
issue. Unfortunately, the examination of the cross-border activity is beyond the purpose 
of this study. 
To summarize, the Hungarian far-right, self-defense organizations perform 
activities that have paramilitary features. In these activities, their underground networks 
pose a specific challenge to current social order. The question remains how connected 
these groups are to one another. Chapter III summarizes the methods used to explore the 
links between and among these groups.  
 
                                                 
76 Sonni Efron and Tad Stahnke, We’re Not Nazis, but, 58. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This study utilizes Visual Analytic methods (Link Analysis, Geospatial Analysis, 
Temporal Analysis, and Social Network Analysis) to analyze Hungarian extreme right-
wing self-defense organizations. The analysis is conducted at the organizational level and 
it focuses on the time-period from the establishment of the old Hungarian Guard in 2007 
until the last national election in 2014.   
The objective of the study is to search for patterns and relationships between the 
organizations and the events in order to ascertain whether a right-wing inter-
organizational network exists within Hungary.  
The first section summarizes the data sources utilized in the study. The second 
section describes how the data are structured. The third section briefly describes how the 
data are analyzed and the results of the analyses are presented in chapter IV.   
A. DATA SOURCES 
Data collection focused on the offensive or paramilitary actions carried out by 
right-wing organizations. Only those events that could be coded with an exact time and 
place were included in this study. The data collected using open sources include 25 
organizations and 275 events. These data include all anti-Roma or anti-Semitic attacks in 
Hungary, along with demonstrations and rallies from 2007—2014 that had media 
attention in newspaper articles and extreme right-wing blogs. The list encompasses all the 
actions of the extreme right-wing organizations with national self-defense and 
paramilitary features and the exact date and place of those events, many of which were 
determined based on the group webpages and news portals. This dataset also covers 
which organizations participated in the events (reflected as the official group affiliations). 
A full description of the sources and the data they provided can be found in Table 2. 
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Table 2.   Primary Data Sources 
Source Data Collected and 
Format 
Methods 
Attacks against Roma in 
Hungary: January 2008-
September 2012 Report 
from the European Roma 
Rights Centre 
62 events (attacks and hate 






The Coordination Forum 
for Countering Antisemitsm 
– Incidents in Hungary: 
2007–2014 
70 events (attacks against 






Google search of extreme 
right-wing blogs, official 
and extremist news portals 
(in Hungarian) 
More than 144 different 
events (anti-Roma political 
events and “show of force” 
rallies/marches, and 
military trainings) from 
2007 till 2014. Unstructured 
Data 




Athena Institute – Extreme 
Right-wing Groups 









European Roma Rights Centre: This center provides data on reported attacks 
against Roma People or their property in Hungary from 2008 through 2012.77 This report 
provided a brief description of the event, the name of its location, and the date of the 
incident. The data contained 62 events in text format.  
The Coordination Forum for Countering Antisemitsm (CFCA): This webpage 
is a state forum that monitors anti-semitic activities throughout the world. It has the 
largest and most comprehensive data base of anti-semitic incidents reported inter alia 
Hungary. The events in the archive can be accessed by date, location and/or category.  
Self-defense group blog posts and official Hungarian news portals: The third 
set of data were gathered by searching news reports and hate group blogs, looking for 
reports of events with paramilitary features including trainings and demonstrations as 
                                                 
77 Catherine, Twigg, Attacks against Roma in Hungary: January 2008–September 2012 (European 
Roma Rights Centre, Budapest, October 1, 2012). http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/attacks-list-in-
hungary.pdf. 
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well as the name of hate groups who participated in them. The primary sources are 
summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3.   Primary Extremist Webpages Used For Data Collection 
Webpage URL Data Collected 
Hungarian Natrional Front’s 
webpage 
http://www.jovonk.info/ event ads, event reports 




event ads, event reports 
Outlaws’ Army’s webpage http://betyarsereg.hu/
akcioink/ 
event reports 










event ads, event reports 
For a Better Future 
Hungarian Self Defense 




event ads, event reports 
New radical news portals http://kuruc.info/ 
http://alfahir.hu/node 
events ads, event reports 
Hungarist news portals http://harcunk.info/ 
http://kitartas.net/ 
events ads, event reports 
 
Athena Institute’s Hate Groups in Hungary: The fourth set of data came from 
the Athena Institute, which maintains a database on Hate Groups in Hungary. This source 
provided information about 24 different hate groups with paramilitary features in 
Hungary, their current activity status, and their publicly-stated connections with other 
hate groups. 
B. DATA STRUCTURE 
The data were coded using the 2014 Naval Postgraduate School’s Visual 
Analytics Course’s (D3610) code book. Table 4 shows the complementary definitions of 
the events examined in this study. 
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Table 4.   Complementary Definitions to the 2014 DA3610 Naval 
Postgraduate School CORE Lab Codebook 
Event Type  Definition 
Show of Force  Any action taken to warn or intimidate an 
opponent and to demonstrate own 
capabilities to act if provoked. It is include 
the civilian security patrols.  
Assault Any purposeful unarmed confrontation that 
results in physical harm to an individual or 
set of individuals. 
Military Training Any designed event that teaches the 
knowledge, skills, and competencies of 
organized armed fight or insurgency in 
order to directly support stated and 
common organizational goals. 
Training Not military specific preparation. It is 
include any designed event that is able to 
indirectly support the knowledge, skills, 
and competencies of organized armed fight 
or insurgency, and it does not have any 
paramilitary feature. For instance: martial 
art or legal training.   
Road March Any movement with special purpose other 
than simple locomotion. It can be also 
considered as ideologically motivated 
physical exercise.  
Vandalism Any event where the nature of the attack 
appears to be based on racist/antisemitic 
ideology. It does not include personal 
confrontation but usually directed against 
physical property. 
Harassment  Any attack when physical confrontation 
does not occur; for instance, this includes 
verbal threats. 
 
C. VISUAL ANALYTICS 
Visual Analytics is a rapidly evolving and multi-disciplinary field that seeks to 
provide the methodologies and the technology to meet the challenges of complex 
problems and large data sets. Several definitions of Visual Analytics exist; however, one 
of the most concise definitions comes from Jim Thomas. He is considered by many a 
visionary in the field of visualization and visual analysis, and was named by the U.S. 
 27
Department of Homeland Security as the founding director of the National Visualization 
and Analytics Center (NVAC) in 2004. He defined Visual Analytics as “the science of 
analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces.”78 Thomas’ definition 
underscores the field’s grounding in a scientific approach, as well its reliance on 
technology to capitalize on a human’s innate ability to process and understand things 
visually. 
Of the number of visual analytic-related methodologies, at least four are of 
specific value to intelligence analysis: Link Analysis, Social Network Analysis, 
Geospatial Analysis, and Temporal Analysis. All four methods, which are valuable on 
their own, are unique approaches that can generate different insights into specific 
problem sets. Consequently, the fusion of these methodologies can provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of a problem set.   
Link Analysis links people, organizations, places, objects, and events to each 
other. This process produces a visualization called a link analysis diagram. This method 
of analysis allows the analysts to examine connections and relationships as well the 
properties of the data points and objects. This study utilizes Palantir, a software platform 
created by Palantir Technologies Inc., as the primary platform for analysis. 
As defined by Stanley Wasserman, social network analysis “provides a precise 
way to define important social concepts, a theoretical alternative to the assumption of 
independent social actors, and a framework or testing theories about structured social 
relationships.”79 It applies social theory and statistical analysis to relationships, or ties, 
that connect people or organizations to each other. Unlike Link Analysis, which includes 
people, places, and things, social network analysis typically only analyzes a single mode, 
or class of entities, such as people or organizations. Because all nodes in a social network 
analysis are the same, standardized values can be assigned to the nodes and their 
properties. These standardized values permit the application of algorithms which provide 
                                                 
78 James J. Thomas and Kristin A. Cook, eds., Illuminating the Path: The Research and Development 
Agenda for Visual Analytics (IEEE Computer Society Press, 2005): 4. 
http://vis.pnnl.gov/pdf/RD_Agenda_VisualAnalytics.pdf 
79 Stanley Wasserman, Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 1994): 17. 
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statistical data and give visual structure to the network in the form of a sociogram.80 The 
social network analysis in this study employs the software called ORA—a dynamic meta-
network assessment and analysis tool developed by CASOS at Carnegie Mellon.81 
Geospatial Analysis, according to Geospatial Analysis: A Comprehensive Guide 
to Principles, Techniques, and Software Tools, “concerns what happens where, and 
makes use of geographic information that links features and phenomena on the Earth’s 
surface to their locations.”82 The data used in this study was processed with Palantir and 
Google Earth software. 
Temporal Analysis concerns the analysis of occurrences or phenomenon over 
time—it helps to answer the question “when” does something occur. This type of analysis 
can significantly increase an analyst’s ability to identify patterns among occurrences and 
draw inferences related to time and duration. Geospatial Analysis and Temporal Analysis 
often are used in tandem to provide additional insight and understanding by marrying 
“when” and “where” questions. One of the most common geospatial-temporal products 
used in intelligence analysis is the heatmap. These maps allow analysts and researchers to 
quickly identify areas where there are concentrations of specific events or phenomena. 
This information can provide insight into a specific topic of interest and subsequently 
guide analysts and decision-makers in their application of limited resources to achieve the 
greatest desired effect. The temporal data analysis is also carried out on Palantir. 
                                                 
80 Stanley Wasserman, Social Network Analysis, 17. 
81 ORA project webpage: http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/. 
82 Michael John De Smith, Michael F. Goodchild, Paul Longley, Geospatial Analysis: A 
Comprehensive Guide to Principles, Techniques and Software Tools (Fourth edition, The Winchelsea 
Press, Winchelsea, UK, 2013): 33. http://www.spatialanalysisonline.com/Extract.pdf. 
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter explores the connections among organizations engaged in offensive 
and paramilitary actions within Hungary. The purpose is to ascertain whether a far-right-
wing network exists, and if it does, to describe the relationships and activity patterns 
among the organizations. 
A. GEOSPATIAL ANALYSIS 
Geospatial Analysis focuses on the “where” question. For the purposes of this 
research, the data set only includes events that had identifiable geospatial properties (i.e., 
geo-referenced data). The refined data set geospatially displays the activities of self-
defense organizations that occurred from 2007—2014—the hotspot map in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.  Hotspot Map of Events Related to Self-Defense or Paramilitary 
Activities in Hungary During the Examined Time-period.  
As one can see, the hotspot map (Figure 5) suggests that paramilitary activities are 
not isolated phenomenon but occur country wide. To explore the geospatial data in 
greater depth, the dataset was disaggregated into two major categories: kinetic and non-
kinetic activities. Kinetic events include any type of violent action involving lethal force 
or direct (face-to-face) confrontation with targeted individuals or groups. This category 
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includes armed attacks, acts of arson, bombings, and sectarian violence. In contrast, non-
kinetic events include acts of influence directed either internally within the self-defense 
groups or externally toward the targeted minority audiences they seek to intimidate. 
These non-kinetic events include political events, show of force events, acts of 
vandalism, harassment, and any self-dense group training events (Table 5).  
Table 5.   Kinetic and Non-Kinetic Events. 















Figure 6.  Hotspot Map of Non-Kinetic (blue) and Kinetic (red) Activities of 
Right-Wing Extremists. 
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There appears to be a correlation between kinetic and non-kinetic events in some 
parts of the country (Figure 6), especially in northeast and southwest Hungary, and 
around the nation’s capital of Budapest. It is reasonable to assume that kinetic and non-
kinetic events are likely triggered or based on the same external factor. Two variables 
worth exploring are the levels of JOBBIK political support (as determined by actual votes 
cast for JOBBIK during the 2010 national elections)83 and the population density of the 
Roma across the country (based on 2010 Hungarian census data).84 As previously 
mentioned, right-wing groups maintain a strong anti-Roma stance, and have 
demonstrated they have a relatively significant level of political support based on the 
2010 national elections when they gained influence. Hence, an overlay of these two 
factors on top of paramilitary activities should provide greater insight into the potential 
relationship between these two factors and paramilitary activity. 
Figure 7 indicates there is a potential relationship between bases of JOBBIK 
political support and the location of Roma populations. For instance, the majority of the 
JOBBIK’s support comes from the northeastern counties that are also densely-populated 
by Romas.  
                                                 
83 Tarki. “Területi Elmozdulások a Pártszimpátiákban a 2010-Es Parlamenti Választások Óta,” 
[Regional shifts in the support of the parties since the 2010 elections] May 2012, 
http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2012/kitekint/20120503_partszimpatia.html. 
84 Prajzer Tamás, “Térképek: Önkormányzati Választások 2010,” [Map: Local government election 




Figure 7.  Comparison of Density of Roma Population (above right) and the 
Political Support of the JOBBIK (above left) in 2010. The densely 
populated areas by Romas colored with red; the higher political support 
highlighted with darker yellow. 
It also appears that self-defense groups do not necessarily focus their activities 
only on areas densely populated by the Roma minority (Figure 6). Based on Figure 7, this 
relationship is very limited because New-Radicals did not receive most of their votes 
from the southwestern counties where the majority of the Romas live and the possibility 
of the ethnic tensions are the highest. As a result, these observations indicate that these 
groups’ ultimate objective appears to be gaining political support, not just simply 
targeting actions against Romas. 
B. TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 
As mentioned earlier, temporal analysis focuses on events as they occur in time. 
During the time period analyzed there were 272 events that were subdivided into the 
following 12 event types. 
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Table 6.   The Distribution of Events. 
Event Type Event Category Quantity 
Show of Force Non-kinetic 61 
Vandalism Non-kinetic 39 
Military Training Non-kinetic 37 
Political Event Non-kinetic 34 
Armed Attack Kinetic 22 
Assault Kinetic 17 
Arson Kinetic 15 
Road March Non-kinetic 14 
Harassment Non-kinetic 13 
Training Non-kinetic 12 
Sectarian Violence Kinetic 7 
Bombing Kinetic 1 
Total: Non-kinetic 272 
 
The events depicted in Figure 8 illustrate the occurrence of kinetic and non-
kinetic events during the period of analysis.  
 
Figure 8.  The Trend Lines of the Non-Kinetic (blue) and Kinetic (red) 
Actions. Five focus areas, where the trend lines follow roughly the 
same patterns, highlighted with light-blue during the examined time 
period.  
Figure 8 reveals a few interesting observations. First, there appears to be a pattern 
between the kinetic and non-kinetic events, as indicated by their trend lines, from 2007 
until 2010. After 2011, the non-kinetic events dominate, whereas the violent actions 
practically ceased. A potential relationship between the two types of events appears to 
reemerge again at the end of 2012 when both trend lines peak at the same time. These 
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observations suggest again that these events may be triggered or regulated by the same 
external factor. 
These trend lines prompt an investigation on the political environment in Hungary 
during these periods when kinetic and non-kinetic events appear to follow the same 
pattern. This investigation resulted in the identification of several key political events 
during the time-period in question (Table 7). 
Table 7.   Key Domestic Political Events Regarding the Self-Defense 
Movements. 
No. Date Event 
1. 03/10/2008  The old Hungarian Guard85 splinters into separate 
factions. The original core members of the old Guard 
leave the movement.   
2. 03/01/2009 The signing of a cooperation agreement between the 
Hungarian National Front and Pax Hungarica.86 
3. 06/07/2009 The JOBBIK is elected to seats in the European 
Parliament. 
4. 06/14/2009 A cooperation agreement established between JOBBIK, 
Hungarian Guard, Outlaws’ Army, and Sixty-four 
Counties Youth Movement.87 
5. 07/02/2009 The old Hungarian Guard is officially dissolved by the 
court. 
6. 07/31/2009 Members of the Death Squad88 arrested. 
7. 04/11/2010  
and 10/03/
2010 
Hungarian national elections, JOBBIK elected to 
Hungarian Parliament. 
8. 08/16/2011 JOBBIK dissociates from the Outlaws’ Army.89 
                                                 
85 Politics.hu. “Hungary Around the Clock - Founders Quit Far-Right Party Jobbik Over Hungarian 
Guard,” March 2008, http://www.politics.hu/20080311/founders-quit-farright-party-jobbik-over-hungarian-
guard/. 
86 Jövőnk.info. “A Magyar Nemzeti Arcvonal És a Pax Hungarica Mozgalom Közös Közleménye,” 
[The mutual statement of the National Front and the Pax Hungarica] March 2009, 
http://jovonk.info/2009/03/20/magyar-nemzeti-arcvonal-es-pax-hungarica-mozgalom-kozos-kozlemenye. 
87 Index.hu. “Összefognak a Nemzeti Radikálisok,” [The national radicals are joining] Jun 2009, 
http://index.hu/belfold/2009/06/14/osszefognak_a_nemzeti_radikalisok/. 
88 Sebestyén István. “Horogkereszt És Sörétes Puska,” [Swastika and shotgun] Hetek Archívum, 
August 2009, http://www.hetek.hu/fokusz/200908/horogkereszt_es_soretes_puska. 
89 Origo.hu. “Elhatárolódik a Jobbik a Faji Háborús Kijelentéstől,” [The Jobbik distance himself from 
the racial war statements] August 2011, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110816-nem-zarja-ki-a-jobbik-
zagyva-gyorgy-gyulat.html. 
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9. 10/07/2012 Disruption of the Hungarian National Front.90 Gyula 
Thurmer, leader of the (Communist) Labour Party and the 
Hungarian National Front group together to prevent the 
eviction of Istvan Kovacs on Erd91 
10. 04/06/2014 Hungarian national election 
11. 05/25/2014 National election to the European Parliament 
12. 07/05/2014 the JOBBIK call the national radical organizations for an 
alliance92 
 
An overlay of these key political events over the kinetic and non-kinetic timelines 
provides interesting insights (Figure 9). The time-periods during which the trend lines of 
kinetic and non-kinetic events follow the same pattern all include a domestic political 
event that has a direct impact on the self-defense groups.  
 
Figure 9.  Key Political Events Regarding the Self-Defense Groups during the 
Examined Time Period. The trend line of non-kinetic actions colored is 
blue and kinetic is red.  
                                                 
90 Jövőnk.info. “Az MNA vezetőségének közleménye,” [The statement of the leadership] October 
2012, http://jovonkinfo.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/az-mna-vezetosegenek-kozlemenye/. 
91 Kustánczi Norbert. “Megmentették Kovács Istvánt – Video,” [Kovács István was saved] FN24, 
October 2012, http://fn.hir24.hu/itthon/2012/10/31/megmentettek-kovacs-istvant-video/. 
92 Híradó. “Szövetségre Hívta a Nemzeti Szervezeteket a Jobbik,” [The Jobbik called for alliance the 
nationalist organizations] July 2014, http://www.hirado.hu/2014/07/05/szovetsegre-hivta-a-nemzeti-
szervezeteket-a-jobbik/. 
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In the case of the first focus period, both trend lines stay relatively stable after the 
break between the old Hungarian Guard and the JOBBIK. This time-period can be 
described as a transitional or power shifting period among the extreme right-wing 
movements. The remaining self-defense groups repositioned themselves to align with 
either group and tried to find their side in the conflict, which largely left their activities 
unchanged for some time. 
During the second focus period, the number of kinetic as well as non-kinetic 
events decreased sharply after the signing of a cooperation agreement between the two 
major Hungarist groups. This trend suggests that the transitional process during the first 
focus period had been over and there was a major control over the self-defense activities. 
This notion is also supported by the cooperation agreement between the JOBBIK and 
several other New-Radical organizations. It seems cooperation agreements between some 
of the extremist groups have direct impact on the levels of both kinetic and non-kinetic 
activities. 
Regarding the third focus period, it appears that the elections had a diminishing 
effect on non-kinetic activities. Before each election (focus periods 2 and 3) the activities 
noticeably increase and subsequently decrease shortly before the actual event. It suggests 
that the non-kinetic paramilitary activities are favorable before the election but the 
affiliation with these actions has a negative effect on the self-defense groups during the 
elections. For instance, it may help mobilize a party’s voter base but the overt support is 
not acceptable in front of a wider public during the actual election. In other words, the 
legal extremist parties have less need for non-kinetic activities after the votes are in. 
During the fourth time-period, tensions appeared between the Outlaws’ Army and 
the JOBBIK. Based on the JOBBIK’s official explanation, the party was no longer 
interested in offensive or paramilitary activities.93 As a result, the level of non-kinetic 
activities decreased. 
                                                 
93 Origo.hu. “Elhatárolódik a Jobbik a Faji Háborús Kijelentéstől,” [The Jobbik distance himself from 
the racial war statements] August 2011, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110816-nem-zarja-ki-a-jobbik-
zagyva-gyorgy-gyulat.html. 
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During the fifth focus period, it appears there was another strategic shift. Since 
2012, some of the leadership of the Hungarian National Front shifted the focus from 
military trainings to overt political activities. The founder, Győrkös István, sought to 
establish a legal party in collaboration with the far-left (communist) Labor Party. This 
action led to dissent within the group. As a result, the level of activities decreased.94  
Additionally, after the arrest of the members of the Death Squad, the number of 
violent kinetic actions never reached the 2009 level again. So it appears that the kinetic 
state actions have a major impact on the level of activities. Consequently, from this point 
the extremist seems to consider violence as an ineffective approach and the groups have 
purposely stayed away from violent attacks. In contrast, the trend line of the non-kinetic 
events demonstrates the opposite trend. In general, since 2011–2012, their numbers are 
dramatically higher than the previous years because of the legal framework of Hungary in 
such that the government might be not able to respond effectively to this approach. It 
appears there was a major shift toward the more sophisticated non-kinetic approach 
regarding the strategy of the self-defense groups. 
To summarize, it would appear that domestic political events related to extremist 
self-defense groups influence the paramilitary and offensive activities. Cooperation 
agreements and tensions among the groups as well as major elections have as much 
diminishing effect on the level of activities as kinetic state actions. Unfortunately, the 
temporal analysis wasn’t able to explain the reason behind the multiple peaks of the non-
kinetic activities between 2013 and 2014, probably because of the shortfalls of the 
dataset.  
C. LINK ANALYSIS 
As previously mentioned, link analysis consists of visualizations depicting 
relationships between entities. In the case of the current dataset, two kinds of 
relationships have been coded between organizations, explicit and implicit links. Explicit 
connections are openly declared ties (i.e., ideology) between one or more organizations. 
                                                 
94 Jövőnk.info. “Az MNA vezetőségének közleménye,” [The statement of the leadership] October 
2012, http://jovonkinfo.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/az-mna-vezetosegenek-kozlemenye/. 
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In contrast, implicit relationships are ties between two or more organizations that are 
linked together by participating in the same event. 
Overall, the data set contains 28 organizations linked to 172 events (out of 272). 
Unfortunately, it was difficult to assign a group, or a perpetrator, to all the events making 
up this dataset. Table 8 shows the most active groups and summarizes the exact 
distribution of the non-violent activities among them. The listed organizations were 
present in the most paramilitary or offensive events during the given time period. The rest 
of the groups were affiliated only five or less events. 
Table 8.   The Most Active Organizations Based On Event Affiliation. 







JOBBIK New-radical 50 2 48 
Hungarian 
National Front 









New-radical 25 4 21 
Outlaws’ Army New-radical 22 0 22 
Hungarian 
National Guard 




New-radical 20 0 20 
New Hungarian 
Guard 





8 8 0 
Pax Hungarica Hungarist 7 0 7 
 
Table 8 clearly shows that the JOBBIK, which is linked to 50 events, is the most 
active organization in this dataset. Among Hungarists, the Hungarian National Front was 
the highest on the list, linked to 42 events. Interestingly, the neo-Nazi or skinhead groups, 
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despite all of the media attention it receives, did not even make the list, having only two 
attributable events.   
In terms of kinetic and non-kinetic activities, The Death Squad committed the 
most kinetic actions with eight events, and the JOBBIK and the Hungarian National Front 
participated in the most non-kinetic actions with 48 and 42 non-kinetic events, 
respectively. The table also suggests that the most active Hungarist groups are not linked 
to any kinetic activities, another interesting observation because of their extensive focus 
on paramilitary training.  
An examination of the relationships between groups maintaining different 
ideologies, as depicted in Figure 10, leads to interesting observations. First, the different 
types of ideological groups typically cluster based on three major ideologies: New-




Figure 10.  The Clustering of the Events Around the Subgroups Based On Ideology. 
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The second interesting observation, which is related to the first, is that ideology 
appears to be a factor affecting the type of events in which groups participate. 
Specifically, groups without specific ideological backgrounds, as seen with the Death 
Squad and Arrows of Hungarians, appear to be more likely to participate in violent 
events. The rest of the organizations, which do have clear ideologies, do not appear to 
participate in violent events. Similarly, events that are more visible to the public 
(especially show the force and political events) are clustered almost entirely around 
organizations that ascribe to the New-Radical ideology. These events are mainly about 
gaining public support or generating media attention. In contrast, the majority of the 
traditional paramilitary activities (military and non-military type trainings) are related 
almost exclusively to Hungarists. Last but not least, the role of skinhead groups, again 
despite the media’s fixation on them, seems to be inconsequential. 
The third observation, and possibly even more telling than the first two, is the 
presence of overlaps or points of contacts between the ideological clusters. Eleven events 
can be considered as key linkages between the different ideologies. Table 9 summarizes 
the properties of these events. 
Table 9.   The Properties of the “Bridging Events.” 
Event Types Locations Groups Involved the Most 
Political Event (3) 
Road March (3) 
Military Training (2) 
Training (2) 






Pax Hungarica (6) 
Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 
(6) 
Hungarian National Front (4) 
JOBBIK (4) 
Outlaw’s Army (4) 
Hungarian National Guard (3) 
 
Two observations are immediately apparent with regards to these “bridging 
events,” which seem to unify groups that have different ideologies. First, most events (7) 
occur outside of the public’s view. Specifically, the majority of these events include 
training events. The road marches also have training functions besides the cultural/
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historical purposes because the participants often required navigating and overcoming 
long distances in formation. 
Second, it seems the Pax Hungarica and the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 
maintain key ideological brokerage functions because these groups were present on the 
“bridging events” six times out of ten total. 
The implicit relationships, which are assumed relationships based on two groups 
participating in the same event, provide additional insight into the network. Based on the 
visualization (Figure 11), where the shared events have been converted into direct links,95 
the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement seems to be the most connected because it has 
relationships with 17 organizations (trough 15 shared events). The JOBBIK, which was 
considered the most active during the event link analysis, is only linked to 13 different 
organizations (over the course of 39 events). These data indicate that the JOBBIK is an 
active, but not necessarily the most connected, organization. Also important to note, the 
groups connected to the most violent activities, specifically the Death Squad, are 
separated from the rest of the organizations. 
                                                 
95 In this case, the conversion of events into direct relationships between organizations is the same 
process of using matrix multiplication to convert two-mode data into one-mode data. Two-mode data are 
relational data containing two different entity classes where as one-mode data are relational data containing 
one.  
 
Figure 11.  The Merged Implicit Links between Groups. The JOBBIK, the 
Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, and the Death Squad are circled.  
Once the implicit and direct relationships are combined, Pax Hungarica emerges 
among the most connected Hungarist group to radical organizations with 8 connections. 
Among the new radicals, the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement has four connections 
with the Hungarists. The Outlaws’ Army and the Hereditary Hungarian Guard follow 
with three connections. In terms of the neo-Nazis, both of the Blood and Honor Hungary 
and the Hungarian Skins link to the Hungarists and to the new radicals. Based on these 
results which identify the different patterns of connections among the right-wing 
organizations, this study now turn to social network analysis to examine these 






D. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
In contrast with the link analysis, SNA typically only analyzes one class of 
entities at a time, which allows analysts to measure characteristics of the network and 
quantify relative importance of the far-right organizations. This analysis utilizes some 
commonly used descriptive measures in order to examine the overall network structure. 
Specifically, this section will use network size, diameter, and measures of cohesion and 
centralization to describe the network. A second section will analyze the network using 
various centrality and brokerage measures to identify relatively important groups within 
the network. 
1. Topographical Analysis 
In this section, the analysis focuses on the entire structure, or the network 
topography. It is important to note that the network size (25) does not include the isolated 
groups (i.e., isolates). As a result, the fragmentation score of the structure is zero because 
every organization is connected at least with one other organization. 
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Figure 12.  The Sociogram of Extreme Right-Wing Self-Defense Groups. The 
ideological backgrounds of the organizations marked with different 
colors.  
Based on the sociogram in Figure 12, the network of the extreme right-wing self-
defense groups forms a single weak component where the different ideological bases do 
not form separate and distinct clusters. In other words, different ideological groups are 
embedded in each other’s web. Consequently, it appears that Hungarian far-right self-
defense movements are relatively close to one another in terms of average path length.  
According to Everton, the Average Distance refers to the average length of all 
shortest paths (or geodesics) between all organizations in the network.96 The relatively 
                                                 
96 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2012), 137. 
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low value (1.97) in Table 10 indicates that information or other resources can diffuse fast 
through the network because the groups are relatively close to each other.   
A related measure, Network Diameter, refers to longest geodesic, or longest 
“shortest path” between any two actors in the network. In other words, its value indicates 
how dispersed the network is.97 Interestingly, the relatively small value (4) also suggests 
that organizations are relatively reachable to one another within the network and that 
information and/or resources only have to traverse four steps at a maximum to go from 
one end to the other. 
The density of the network is the ratio of actual ties (84) divided by all possible 
ties (300). Its value (0.28) seems relatively low and suggests that the network is sparse; 
lots of potential ties do not exist.98 Thus, while the organizations are relatively close to 
one another and may have access to one another, several organizations are not directly 
linked and must rely on brokers and key actors to diffuse information and resources. 
Table 10.   Network-Level Measures from ORA’s Standard Network 
Analysis Report. 
Measure Value 
Average Distance 1.977 
Network levels (diameter) 4.000 
Density 0.280 
Betweenness centralization 0.227 
 
The Girvan-Newman algorithm, one of the so called “community detection” 
algorithms, help detect clusters within the larger network. This algorithm, although not 
technically a topographic measure, will help identify potential seams in the network and 
can help indicate how ideological groups cluster within the overall network structure. 
Table 11 and Figure 13 show the three main ones. 
                                                 
97 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 137. 
98 The formal measure of density is inversely related to network size (i.e., the larger the network, the 
lower the density) because the number of possible lines increases exponentially as actors join the network. 
So this value itself doesn’t say much about estimated network cohesion or cohesive subgroups.  
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Table 11.   The Main Potential Clusters among the Network. 
Group 
no. Size Members 
1 10 
Defense Force, Hungarian National Guard, For a Better Future 
Hungarian Self Defense, The Raggeds, Guards of the Carpathian 
Homeland Movement, Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, JOBBIK, 
Pax Hungarica, Outlaws’ Army, New Hungarian Guard 
2 5 Hungaria Skins, Blood & Honour Hungary, National Revolutionary Party, Hungarian National Front, NS Straight Edge 
3 4 Hungarian Guard, National Protection Force, Nationalist Motorcyclists, Civil Assosiation for Patka 
 
Figure 13.  Clusters among the Network of Extreme Right-Wing Self-Defense 
Groups. The main clusters (number 1 to 3 based on Table 11) marked 
with different colors.  
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The results of the community detection analysis suggest that the organizations 
form clusters independently of their core ideology. In other words, the Hungarists, 
Skinheads, as well as New-Radicals, can be found in the same structural groups. This 
finding not only suggests that groups are close to one another on average but also that 
different ideological groups tend to cluster. To arrive at a more accurate conclusion, 
attributes other than ideology need to considered. 
 
Figure 14.  Comparison of the Declared ‘Relationship to Democratic State 
Order’ and the ‘Transparency’ of the Groups. Groups that accept the 
democratic order mark with green on the left side, organizations that 
operate transparent to the public highlighted with light green on the 
right side.  
The visualization of the ‘relationship to democratic state order’ and the 
‘transparency’ attributes99 of the groups (Figure 14) highlight additional insights. First, 
                                                 
99 As it was mentioned earlier regarding Table 1, the ‘relationship with democratic institutions’ 
describe the level of rejection of the current legal social structure, the ‘public relations’ refers the public 
transparency or the openness of the groups. 
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the largest organizations that do not plan to overthrow the democratic political system 
(the JOBBIK and the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement) are structurally surrounded 
with groups that do seek to do so. Second, the overtly operating organizations are 
intermixed into the web of the covertly, or only partially transparent groups. These data 
suggest that the transparent organizations have extensive relationships with more covert 
groups. Consequently, these legal entities may able to influence the network of self-
defense movements. 
Centralizations measures capture the hierarchical dimension of network 
topography. As Everton summarizes, in general, the larger a centralization index is, the 
more likely it is that a single group is very central while the other organizations are not, 
so these measures can be seen as measuring how unequal the distribution of individual 
values are. A central group can be considered as an organization that has numerous ties 
with the others (Degree Centrality), that has numerous ties to highly central groups 
(Eigenvector Centrality), that is close (in terms of path length) to other organizations 
(Closeness Centrality), that lies on the shortest path between numerous pairs of groups in 
the network (Betweenness Centrality).100 
Nevertheless, Everton also suggests that Betweenness Centralization is closer to 
the intuitive understanding of hierarchy than other measures.101 Consequently, this 
analysis will focus on this particular measure over the other three. As seen in Table 10, in 
the case of the overall network, its value is relatively low (0.227), so there is not a single 
organization that serves as a central gatekeeper between the rest of the groups. 
2. Actor-Level Analysis 
This section now turns to actor-level measures to identify relatively important 
actors within the right-wing network. This section utilizes four commonly used centrality 
measures. The first measure, degree centrality, is simply the count of an actor’s ties 
within a network (at least within an undirected network). It often identifies potentially 
influential or relatively active actors within a network. The second metric, betweenness 
                                                 
100 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 207. 
101 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 225. 
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centrality, measures the extent to which each actor lays on the shortest path between all 
other actors in the network. Actors with high betweenness centrality often have relatively 
high brokerage potential. Closeness centrality measures how close on average an actor is 
to all other actors in a network. This measure is often associated with each actor’s level 
of accessibility to other actors in the network. Finally, eigenvector centrality is similar to 
degree centrality, but it assumes that ties to highly central actors are more important than 
ties to peripheral actors. Figure 15 highlights all the organizations with the top ranked 
centrality measures.102 
 
Figure 15.  The Sociogram Of Extreme Right-Wing Self-Defense Groups When 
the Node Size Based on Betweenness Centrality Score. The ideological 
backgrounds of the organizations marked with different colors.  
                                                 
102 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 207. 
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Based on the combined scores, the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement is 
potentially the most influential in the overall network. It ranks first across all four 
centrality measures, indicating that is has the greatest potential influence, brokerage 
potential and accessibility to other actors in the network. In addition, certain groups, such 
as the Hungarian National Front the JOBBIK, the Outlaws’ Army and the Pax Hungarica, 
repeatedly rank highly in the basic centrality measures (Table 12). 
Table 12.   The Top Ranked Groups Based on Basic Centrality Measures. 
Rank Degree Centrality Value
1 Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 0.708 
2 JOBBIK 0.542 
3 Pax Hungarica 0.542 
4 Outlaws’ Army 0.542 
5 Hungarian National Front 0.500 
 
Rank Betweenness Centrality Value 
1 Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 0.260 
2 Hungarian National Front 0.213 
3 Hungarian Guard 0.180 
4 JOBBIK 0.119 
5 Outlaws’ Army 0.114 
 
Rank Eigenvector Centrality Value 
1 Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 0.552 
2 Outlaws’ Army 0.473 
3 JOBBIK 0.436 
4 Pax Hungarica 0.431 
5 Hungarian National Guard 0.388 
 
 
Rank Closeness Centrality Value
1 Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 0.774 
2 Outlaws’ Army 0.686 
3 JOBBIK 0.649 
4 Pax Hungarica 0.649 
5 Hungarian National Front 0.615 
 
 
An alternative set of measures exist that allows analysts to identify sets of key 
actors. These measures, or Key Player measures (often referred to as critical sets), exist 
because in many real-world networks there is rarely one actor whose removal either 
completely fragments the network or who reaches all other actors in the network.103 
Consequently, Borgatti offers two algorithms that either identifies sets of actors who 
maximally fragment a network or sets of actors who reach the most unique set of 
                                                 
103 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 272. 
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actors.104 The first algorithm, the fragmentation measure, is designed to disrupt a network 
through the removal of sets of actors while the second one, the reach measure, can be 
used to identify sets of actors to most effectively spread disinformation. In this analysis, 
the critical sets results align with the list of central actors (Table 13). Again, the results 
demonstrate the relative structural importance of the Sixty-four Counties Youth 
Movement, JOBBIK, the Hungarian National Front, and Pax Hungarica. 
Table 13.   The Comparison of Critical Set of Groups and the List of Top 
Ranked Central Actors Based on Centrality Measures. 
Critical Set Central Actors 
Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 








Hungarian National Front 
                                                 
104 Stephen P. Borgatti, “Identifying Sets of Key Players in a Social Network.” Computational & 





Figure 16.  The Critical Set of Extreme Right-Wing Self-Defense Groups 
(highlighted with green).  
Specifically, the fragmentation results suggest the simultaneous removal of 
several key organizations would almost completely fragment the network. In fact, the 
value after removing the critical set nodes is 0.742, which is relatively close to 1 where 
almost every organization is isolated. This approach, however, is highly unlikely to occur 
in reality given the inability (legally and in terms of capability) of the government to 
isolate each organization. Fortunately, some other groups (Falcon Youth Movement, 
Nationalist Motorcyclists, Unified Hungary Movement, Civil Association for Patka and 
the National Protection Force) are peripheral to the network and appear to be the most 
vulnerable to being isolated based on their current position in the network, which means 
their removal may not significantly affect the operation of the network, but may offer 
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alternative strategies for degrading the network. Table 14 provides a summary of the 


















Blood & Honor Hungary no 0.000 0.533 0.250 0.219 
Civil Association for Patka no 0.000 0.358 0.042 0.023 
Conscience 88 Group no 0.000 0.500 0.167 0.152 
Defense Force no 0.000 0.511 0.250 0.271 
Eastern Front Comradely Association no 0.000 0.436 0.125 0.097 
Falcon Youth Movement no 0.000 0.387 0.042 0.036 
For a Better Future Hungarian Self Defense no 0.001 0.522 0.292 0.305 
Guards of the Carpathian Homeland Movement no 0.003 0.545 0.333 0.348 
Hereditary Hungarian Guard no 0.005 0.462 0.167 0.135 
Hungaria Skins no 0.000 0.533 0.250 0.219 
Hungarian Guard no 0.180 0.545 0.333 0.209 
Hungarian National Front yes 0.213 0.615 0.500 0.328 
Hungarian National Guard no 0.033 0.571 0.417 0.388 
Hungarian Self Defense Movement no 0.001 0.511 0.208 0.198 
JOBBIK yes 0.119 0.649 0.542 0.436 
NS Straight Edge no 0.000 0.533 0.250 0.219 
National Protection Force no 0.000 0.421 0.083 0.070 
National Revolutionary Party no 0.003 0.545 0.292 0.265 
Nationalist Motorcyclists no 0.000 0.358 0.042 0.023 
New Hungarian Guard no 0.018 0.571 0.333 0.337 
Outlaws’ Army yes 0.114 0.686 0.542 0.473 
Pax Hungarica yes 0.113 0.649 0.542 0.431 
Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement yes 0.2600 0.7742 0.7083 0.5519 
The Raggeds no 0.000 0.522 0.250 0.285 
Unified Hungary Movement no 0.000 0.387 0.042 0.036 
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In order to better understand the results, they are summarized in a separate (Table 
15). 
Table 15.   Summary of Basic Node-Level Measures 
Node-Level 
Measure Avg Min/Max Min/Max Nodes 
Centrality, 
Betweenness 0.042 0.000 12 nodes (48%) have this value 
  0.260 Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 
Centrality, 
Closeness 0.525 0.358 
Nationalist Motorcyclists, Civil 
Association for Patka 
  0.774 Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 
Centrality, Degree 0.280 0.042 4 nodes (16%) have this value 
  0.708 Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 
Centrality, 
Eigenvector 0.242 0.023 
Nationalist Motorcyclists, Civil 
Association for Patka 
  0.552 Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement 
 
In summary, it can be suggested that the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, 
the JOBBIK, the Outlaws’ Army, the old Hungarian Guard and the Hungarian National 
Front have the most impact on the paramilitary activities and capability building among 
the extreme far-right groups in Hungary. Interestingly, the roles the Nationalist 
Motorcyclists, and the Civil Association for Patka, come out as negligible. 
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V. DISCUSSION 
Given the insights from the four different approaches of Visual Analytics, the 
project is able to synthesize the following findings: 
A. IDENTIFIED PATTERNS 
Geospatial Analysis: 
 Actions related to paramilitary activities occur country wide, because in 
contrast with their rhetoric, self-defense groups’ ultimate objective 
appears to be attracting political support nation-wide, not just targeting 
actions against Romas. 
Temporal Analysis: 
 Domestic political events related to extremist self-defense groups appears 
influence the paramilitary and offensive activities.  
Link Analysis: 
 Self-defense groups are not openly associated with kinetic actions.  
 The neo-Nazi groups, despite all of the media attention, do not have 
significant role in paramilitary or offensive activities. 
 The co-sponsored trainings are the primary “bridging events” between 
groups with different ideological basis. 
SNA: 
 The network of self-defense groups is decentralized (at least in terms of 
brokerage potential) and different ideological groups are intermeshed. 
Information or other resources can diffuse rapidly through the network 
with the help of several key organizations.  
 The Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, the JOBBIK, the Outlaws’ 
Army and the Pax Hungarica are repeatedly ranked highly across actor-
level measures and they have extensive relationships with more covert 
groups. 
 Only the simultaneous removal of critical set of groups, such as Sixty-four 
Counties Youth Movement, Hungarian National Front, JOBBIK, Pax 
Hungarica and Outlaws’ Army, would be able to fragment substantially 
the network.   
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B. INTERPRETATION 
The analytical results from the previous section must be put into context in order 
to provide strategic solutions for the threat posed by these self-defense movements. As it 
was pointed out earlier, in the case of ‘national self-defense,’ the boundaries are blurred 
between the three main, the New-Radical, the Hungarist, and Skinhead/neo-Nazi far-right 
political views. The main difference remains only the level of rejection of the current 
legal social structure.105 Based on the rhetoric, some of the groups openly seek the 
overthrow of the existing order. 
The broad socio-economic processes favor the emergence of self-defense groups 
in general. As it was summarized in chapter II, Hungary’s history, as well as its current 
political and economic context, is generating anxieties that fuel extreme right-wing 
ideologies. In general, the higher crime rate typical of underdeveloped Roma-inhabited 
regions has prompted extreme right-wing rhetoric and resulted in political advances 
based on fears of ‘gypsy-crime.’ Based on the analysis, this trend is observable 
nationwide and is not only limited to areas populated densely by the Roma. 
The right-wing, self-defense organizations adapt their rhetoric but also their 
operating procedures. The self-defense organizational network provides fast information 
distribution, flexibility, and survivability. The groups can learn how to avoid most of the 
direct (kinetic) law-enforcement strategies because they are able to easily share their 
experiences of ongoing law enforcement operations based on the relative short path 
length in the network. 
Based on the analysis, it appears that the network of organizations interested in 
‘national self-defense’ is really intermeshed, and alliances are not formed based solely on 
the organizations’ original core ideologies. This is likely why training events or historical 
marching serve as a bridge between organizations that can link them despite their 
ideological differences.  
The leading legal New-Radical party, the JOBBIK, seemingly the most active 
player, enjoys the most benefits of the growing popularity of extreme right-wing groups. 
                                                 
105 Tóth Ferenc, We were, we are, we will be?, 8. 
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As a result, in contrast with their rhetoric, domestic political interests might have bigger 
impact on the self-defense groups than any real security issues. This finding is also 
confirmed by the Hungarian National Front’s former leadership’s continuous pursuit of 
party formation.106 
This analysis also points out that there is no single, central or influential 
organization that has significant influence and direct, conscious control over paramilitary 
activities. Rather, the prominent organizations that are repeatedly top ranked regarding 
the basic centrality measures should be viewed as the ringleaders among the self-defense 
movements. The JOBBIK, just like most of the moderate groups, has consistently denied 
any involvement in violent activities or using inciting rhetoric. Its rise to elected office 
has opened political space and attracted even more extremist groups and ideologies. As a 
result, the emergence of one of their proxies, the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, 
as the most connected organization, suggests its indirect control over the network. 
The JOBBIK periodically and publically terminates and renews the connections 
with the more radical groups depending on how the voter base views these affiliations. 
For instance, in 2011, Vona Gábor distanced himself from racial guerilla war against 
Jews associated with Outlaws’ Army,107 but right after the election in 2014, he took steps 
to renew his connection.108 Based on the analysis, this kind of periodic alliance has as 
much impact on the level of paramilitary or offensive activities as the kinetic state 
actions. 
To summarize, the extremist self-defense organizations appear to be constantly 
adapting to the legal conditions of Hungary. The analysis suggests their potential threat is 
far beyond Roma human right issues. Their network is able to motivate the ideologically 
uncommitted population to support the extremists’ by addressing ‘national defense’ 
                                                 
106 Jövőnk.info. “Az MNA Vezetőségének Közleménye,” [The statement of the leadership] October 
2012, http://jovonkinfo.wordpress.com/2012/10/07/az-mna-vezetosegenek-kozlemenye/. 
107 Origo.hu. “Elhatárolódik a Jobbik a Faji Háborús Kijelentéstől,” [The Jobbik distance himself from 
the racial war statements] August 2011, http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20110816-nem-zarja-ki-a-jobbik-
zagyva-gyorgy-gyulat.html 
108 Híradó. “Szövetségre Hívta a Nemzeti Szervezeteket a Jobbik,” [The Jobbik called for alliance the 
nationalist organizations] July 2014, http://www.hirado.hu/2014/07/05/szovetsegre-hivta-a-nemzeti-
szervezeteket-a-jobbik/. 
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issues nationwide. The hands of the law-enforcement are tied because the paramilitary 
activities and tactics are consciously designed to slip below the legal threshold for 
reaction. As a side effect, this feature promotes popular support and constant growth for 
the Hungarian extreme right-wing self-defense groups because the cost related to 
participation or joining remains acceptable for the potential supporters. Additionally, the 
mere existence of an intermeshed network with paramilitary capabilities whose kinetic 
and non-kinetic activities can be initiated by an external actor, for instance Russia, poses 
a potential threat to Hungarian national security. 
C. STRATEGIC OPTIONS 
In the case of Hungary, law enforcement is primarily responsible for the issue of 
tracking and disrupting self-defense/paramilitary networks. As Treverton (2009) 
summarizes in his work, the law enforcement approach built on “after-the-fact” 
investigations in order to develop criminal cases, does not predict future actions as part of 
a broader more strategic intelligence effort.109 Thus, it has been difficult to mount 
credible and legitimate response against the groups. Currently, the government’s main 
line of counter-efforts is still directed against the Nazi, anti-Semitic ideology and the 
Skinhead organizations even if their roles are negligible based on this analysis. 
Based on this analysis, the question arises: What strategic options does the 
government have to counter these right-wing organizations? The main goal is to 
destabilize and degrade the abilities of the self-defense group network. Typically, there 
are at least three indicators of destabilization according to Carley, Lee, and Krachardt 
(2002).110 First, the information flow through the network has been seriously reduced. 
Second, “the network as a decision making body, can no longer reach a consensus, or 
takes much longer to do so.”111 Third, the network’s accuracy at doing tasks has been 
                                                 
109 Gregory F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (1 edition, Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2009): 121. 
110 Kathleen M. Carley, Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt, Destabilizing Networks (Carnegie 
Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 2002): 84. 
http://www.hks.harvard.edu/netgov/files/complexity/carley%20paper.pdf 
111 Carley, Kathleen M., Ju-Sung Lee, and David Krackhardt, Destabilizing Networks, 84. 
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impaired. To carry out these goals, the following strategic options are identified based on 
the Roberts and Everton typology.  
Roberts and Everton summarize (2011), “the kinetic approach involves aggressive 
and offensive measures to eliminate or capture network members and their supporters, 
while the non-kinetic approach involves the use of subtle, non-coercive means for 
combating dark networks.”112 Usually, the kinetic approach receives more attention 
because the capture and elimination of high-value targets attracts headlines and 
engenders popular support. In contrast, according to Everton, the non-kinetic approach 
requires sophisticated skills and it takes longer than a kinetic campaign and tends to 
attract far less attention because of its low profile nature.113 Although identified as a 
broad set of separate options, these approaches can complement each other.114 Based on 
the experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, kinetic actions may be urgent and necessary in 
the short term, but it is merely “a holding action that buys time for the indirect approach 
to have its decisive effect in the longer term.”115  
1. Kinetic Approaches 
The kinetic approaches considered here are targeting and capacity building 
strategies. The former takes place in the form of high profile raids or strikes that can be 
directed by an advising force (i.e., the U.S. in Afghanistan) or by host-nation armed 
forces. It focuses on the removal of stakeholders based on their position in the network or 
the disruption of key ties among the entities.116 In the case of Hungarian extremists, the 
SNA analysis suggests that only the removal of the optimal or so called critical set of 
organizations can disconnect the network of self-defense groups. Based on the network 
                                                 
112 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks.” Journal of Social 
Structure, volume 12, (2011): 23. doi: 
http://www.cmu.edu/joss/content/articles/volume12/RobertsEverton.pdf. 
113 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 33. 
114 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 23. 
115 Eric T. Olson. “Remarks to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy” (speech. Washington 
Institute in Washington, DC, 17 September 2009). 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/html/pdf/Olsonremarks20090917.pdf 
116 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 4. 
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metrics, if the kinetic approach were pursued, it should target the Sixty-four Counties 
Youth Movement, the Hungarian National Front, the JOBBIK, the Pax Hungarica and the 
Outlaws’ Army simultaneously.   
This approach, however, has limitations given Hungary’s current legal and 
constitutional framework. No connections have been established between illegal activities 
and the right-wing extremist network. Therefore, targeting a person, group or 
organization to prevent their activities is limited exclusively to the internal disruption via 
provocateurs.117 Moreover, the interconnectedness of the network’s ideological groups 
along its relatively low levels of centralizations suggests kinetic options would have 
limited effect anyway.  
Based on the Roberts and Everton typology, capacity-building, refers to the 
strategy where our own armed forces would work “through, by and with” indigenous 
forces to build their capacity to conduct effective targeting operations against a common 
enemy.118 In this case, the focus is on the training of a third party to carry out aggressive, 
coercive tactics. As mentioned above, these types of approaches are limited within the 
Hungarian context. Additionally, in a stable democratic state, only the state can have the 
monopoly of violence; the authority cannot be transferable to a third party. Moreover, the 
network is adaptive by keeping up-to-date on law enforcement operations, sharing their 
experiences and holding trainings in legal issues. Without the actual violation of law, the 
unjustified use of these kinetic tools will compromise the law-enforcement tactics and 
techniques in the long-run.  
To summarize, the Hungarian government should refrain from the use of kinetic 
actions against the self-defense groups that are not associated with kinetic actions, even 
in the case of those organizations (the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement, the 
JOBBIK, the Outlaws’ Army and the Pax Hungarica) that are repeatedly ranked highly 
                                                 
117 Jövőnk.info. “Egy Újabb Sikertelen NBH-Akció Tanulságai,” [Lessons of another unsuccessful 
NBH operation] March 2003, http://www.jovonk.info/2009/03/22/egy-ujabb-sikertelen-nbh-akcio-
tanulsagai. 
118 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 5. 
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across actor-level measures and they have extensive relationships with more covert 
groups. 
2. Non-Kinetic Approaches 
In contrast, the non-kinetic approach involves indirect power to undermine 
underground networks. Its primary goal is counter-influence. It employs numerous 
sophisticated ways to cut the enemy’s ties to the population: institution-building, 
Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Information Operations (IO), and rehabilitation and 
reintegration.119 Based on the growing popularity of the self-defense movements in 
Hungary, the non-kinetic approach would deal with right-wing challenges indirectly.  
a. Option 1: Institution Building 
As the analysis demonstrated, the trainings and the paramilitary capability 
building events under the umbrella of ‘national self-defense’ are able to unite the 
ideologically divided groups. Therefore, the Hungarian government must target this idea 
indirectly.  
In general, the first non-kinetic approach concentrates its efforts on building 
institutions of governance, rule of law, and economic development in war-torn 
communities.120 In the case of Hungarian far-right, self-defense organizations, the focus 
should be on those youth sympathizers who are not necessary ideologically committed 
but who are drawn to uniforms, weapons and sense of ‘national self-defense.’ The 
government could absorb these individuals under the umbrella of a legal organization. 
Perhaps a national guard-like organization could be established in lieu of the conscript 
system.121 Although the reserve element of the Hungarian Defense Force (HDF) 
                                                 
119 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 34. 
120 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton, “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 5. 
121 Malkovics Tibor, Jó Szomszédi (v)iszonyok? A Jobboldali (nemzeti) Radikalizmus És a Hazai 
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currently exists,122 it is the focus of the extremist propaganda and branded as just a 
scam.123 If transformed, this organization could attract those youth who are not 
ideologically committed but seek military challenges that the right-wing self-defense 
groups offer.  
This new institution could provide an alternative to those attracted to ‘national 
self-defense’ ideals. In order to be successful, the new institution would need to meet 
three main requirements: first, it should be organized on territorial basis, so members can 
serve their own community and address local issues. Second, the members would not be 
deployed abroad so the new institution would not be branded as a “mercenary army.” 
Third, the new institution must base on Counter-Unconventional Warfare124 (Counter-
UW) capabilities to provide a credible strategic-level ability to interdict and roll back any 
possible external sponsorship of self-defense movements.125 
Currently, only the HDF’s Special Forces Battalion has the professional basis to 
establish an organization that can meet all of the requirements above. With their 
guidance, a Reserve Special Forces unit could be established to attract the non-
ideological youth who form the base of their right-wing self-defense organizations. 
Recommended Course of Action (COA): The HDF should expand the 
Voluntary Reserve Force and establish a counter-UW capable territorial element under 
the advice of the Hungarian Special Forces. The new organization would bridge the gap 
between the government and right-wing group members to attract and collect the youth 
population committed to “national defense.’  
                                                 
122 The Hungarian Voluntary Reserve Force based on voluntary defense- and voluntary operational 
reservists. The first group responsible for the protection of the bases and installations of the HDF, the 
second group can be mobilized in case of national emergency.  
123 Jövőnk.info. “A Tartalékos Haderő Is Átverés?” [Is the reserve force just a scum?] December 
2010, http://www.jovonk.info/2010/12/22/tartalekos-hadero-atveres. 
124 Unconventional Warfare (UW)—defined in military doctrine as activities conducted to enable a 
resistance movement to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government. 
125 Janine Davidson, “Counter-Unconventional Warfare Is the Way of the Future. How Can We Get 
There?” Defense in Depth, October 2014, http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/10/23/counter-
unconventional-warfare-is-the-way-of-the-future-how-can-we-get-there/. 
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b. Option 2: Communication Campaign 
To influence the network of self-defense groups, another strategy could be to 
target indirectly the central groups because they score highly in basic brokerage and 
centrality measures. 
According to the definition of U.S. Special Operations Command, PSYOPS 
involves the dissemination of information for influencing the emotions, perceptions, 
attitudes, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign nationals so they are 
more aligned with U.S. goals and objectives during times of conflict and peace.126 
PSYOP can also employ counter adversary propaganda to reduce their will to fight. 
Everton notes that this strategy can also be used to turn network members or subgroups 
against one other.127 Unfortunately, the use of this military tactic domestically is illegal.  
The paramilitary activities require a broader national security discussion. Based 
on current regulations, the military intelligence community (IC), as well as the Hungarian 
armed forces are not competent to act on any home affairs issues.128 Therefore, to settle 
the issue of Hungarian self-defense movement extensive professional consultation and 
knowledge sharing is necessary with the competent law-enforcement professionals about 
the lessons learned regarding HDF’s successful PSYOP/CIMIC and SOF engagements. 
Such a new domestic communication campaign with limited aims could be a tool of the 
government to counter domestic right-wing influence.  
The main goal of the new communication campaign would be to prevent the 
consensus among the leaders and supporters base of the self-defense groups. The 
destabilization can be reached by the capitalization of the existing ideological frictions 
among the far-right organizations. This option could exploit the inconsistency between 
protecting ‘national self-defense’ and supporting possible foreign influence (i.e., by 
Russia). This new law-enforcement communication campaign can include overt 
messaging (through mass media) and covert disinformation (through agents).  
                                                 
126 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton. “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 6. 
127 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 35. 
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Recommended COA: Law-enforcement should launch a new communication 
campaign to exploit the existing ideological frictions among the groups and the 
inconsistency regarding the possible foreign influence. In order to destabilize the 
network, the campaign must be directed against the Sixty-four Counties Youth 
Movement, the JOBBIK, the Outlaws’ Army, and the Pax Hungarica because they are 
repeatedly ranked highly across actor-level measures and they have extensive 
relationships with more covert groups. 
c. Option 3: IO Campaign 
As the analysis highlighted, the co-sponsored trainings are the primary “bridging 
events” between groups with different ideological basis. Therefore, the Hungarian 
government could target these events non-kinetically. 
In the case of Hungarian self-defense organizations, IO means the integrated 
employment of Electronic Warfare (EW)129 and computer network operations to detect 
paramilitary activities such as trainings and capability development. It also refers to the 
monitoring of charitable donations and the transfer of funds to these organizations. 
Currently, this is the most widely used tool by the law enforcement. Cell phones and 
online messaging should be monitored to keep an eye on stakeholders, their followers and 
their activities.130 More importantly, these EW efforts should focus primary on the 
bridging events highlighted by the analysis, not just simply on the most active 
organizations among the network in general. As the analysis demonstrated, the network 
of self-defense groups is decentralized and the information or other resources has the 
potential to diffuse rapidly throughout the network. Therefore, the primary goal of this 
option would be to reduce this ability of information to flow freely. 
Recommended COA: The Hungarian government should develop and utilize a 
new IO concept in order to prevent the bridging events. The EW capabilities of the law-
enforcement must attack, deceive, and disrupt information operation capabilities of the 
                                                 
129 The term of Electronic Warfare (EW) is used to describe any action which is executed in the 
information environment.  
130 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 35. 
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groups identified as the most active regarding these events (Pax Hungarica, Sixty-four 
Counties Youth Movement, Hungarian National Front, Hungarian National Guard, 
JOBBIK, Outlaw’s Army) in order to destabilize the network. 
d. Option 4: Rehabilitation and Reintegration Program 
Another strategy to degrade the network is related to target non-kinetically the 
peripheral groups because, based on the analysis, they are the most vulnerable to being 
isolated.  
In the case of Hungary, the over simplification and generalization about radical 
ideologies encourages their dissemination. Although the mass media and the public 
constantly condemn the Nazi ideology, based on this analysis, the role of neo-Nazis and 
skinheads does not appear to be a significant factor behind the paramilitary or self-
defense activities. Instead, the current anti-Nazi condemnations appear to improve the 
cohesion among the extremists and radicalize them.131  
A counter-ideological program based on moderate insiders with more balanced 
views132 is needed. Referred to as rehabilitation, they could engage the public in a broad 
public discussion on matters of security. Members of right-wing organizations could be 
invited to participate in professional discussions concerning issues like civil defense, 
disaster management. Self-organized civic policing and providing security for citizens 
must become unaffected by political considerations. The government could support these 
initiatives because these discussion forums would reintegrate the ideologically non 
hardcore members of the groups back into the society.  
Recommended COA: To design the future of ‘national self-defense,’ the HDF 
should organize open forum about the issues of the peripheral actors identified by the 
analysis (Falcon Youth Movement, Nationalist Motorcyclists, Unified Hungary 
                                                 
131 Betyársereg. “Eltakarítottuk Pécsről a ‘Kommunista Söpredéket’ (+videó),” [Pécs was cleared 
away the Communist scum] February 2014, http://betyarsereg.hu/eltakaritottuk-pecsrol-a-kommunista-
sopredeket-video/. 
132 Nancy Roberts and Sean F. Everton. “Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” 6. 
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Movement, Civil Association for Patka, and the National Protection Force), who are the 
most easily isolated from the network of self-defense groups. 
D. STRATEGIC OPTIONS COMPARISON  
This study compares the available options to provide an effective and feasible 
strategic solution to destabilize the network of self-defense groups. The comparison 
includes the analysis and the evaluation of each identified strategic option from the 
Hungarian government’s perspective. To reach the best recommendation with the highest 
probability of success, this study establishes evaluation criteria to assess the risk and 
potential benefits of each option. 
1. Evaluation Criteria 
Before the employment of any counter measure, the Hungarian government 
should consider the following requirements: 
1. Feasibility: the strategic option is capable of being suitable and being 
done within the current legal framework of Hungary. It doesn’t require 
any changing or shaping of the regulations. 
2. Simplicity: the strategic option does not require capabilities and special 
knowledge other than the available and competent law-enforcement tools. 
It does not require any time-consuming or complex capability building. 
3. Flexibility: the strategic option is able to adapt and to be responsive to 
changes regarding the tactics and techniques of the adversaries. It provides 
the best flexibility to meet “unknowns” during the execution. 
4. Political sensitivity: the implication of the strategic option cannot harm 
the broad social, economic, domestic, and foreign affair interests of 
Hungary. The accomplishment poses minimum risk to government, for 
instance negative press coverage. 
5. Short-term effectiveness: the strategic option has the capability of 
producing a temporary but immediate destabilizing effect on the network 
of self-defense groups. 
6. Long-term effectiveness: the strategic option has the capability of 
producing a durable but gradual destabilizing effect on the network of 
self-defense groups. 
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2. Decision Matrix 
A common technique to compare strategic options is a decision matrix using the 
criteria outlined above in order to compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the options. 
Table 16 shows the relative order of the options regarding each criterion, ranging from 
one to four where four means the full compliance with the requirements. Three criterions 
are seemed to the most important—feasibility, political sensitivity and long-term 
effectiveness—therefore receive double counts. 
Table 16.   Decision Matrix. The best suited options are highlighted 
regarding each criterion. 











Feasibility * 3 (6) 4 (8) 1 (2) 2 (4) 
Simplicity 2 1 3 4 
Flexibility 1 4 2 3 
Political 
sensitivity * 
4 (8) 3 (6) 2 (4) 1 (2) 
Short-term 
effectiveness 
1 2 4 3 
Long-term 
effectiveness * 
4 (8) 3 (6) 1 (2) 2 (4) 
Total: 15 17 13 15 
Total weighed: 26 27 17 20 
 
Table 16 suggests that Option 2 (Communication Campaign) is the most effective 
strategic solution to destabilize the network of self-defense-groups. However, the 
difference is insignificant compare with the weighed scores of Option 1 (Institution 
Building). The decision matrix determines the Option 3 (IO Campaign) as the least 
suitable COA. If we consider the great adaptability of the network, this suggestion 
appears to be justified in general.  
The decision matrix alone cannot provide a solution; it just compares the 
competing COAs. As Table 16 suggests, Option 2 (Communication Campaign) scores 
low regarding simplicity, because this strategy requires capability building by the law-
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enforcement. The HDF has the required professionals but the transfer of the special 
knowledge is time consuming. To full fill this gap, the Hungarian government could 
consider employing other solutions as well to increase the short-term effectiveness of the 
counter measures. Therefore, the final recommendation is use the best features of each 
option to come up with a combined strategy. 
3. Overall Recommended COA 
To summarize, in the case of the groups that have not violated the law, the use of 
kinetic approaches is very limited. In order to conduct effective counter measures the 
Hungarian government should build up the HDFs counter-UW capabilities via the 
establishment of a territorial Reserve Special Forces (option 1). To counter balance the 
disadvantages of this strategy (relative ineffective and inflexible in short-term), launch 
communication campaign (option 2) in order to form the public opinion and trigger 
tensions among the members of the self-defense groups. At the same time, it is necessary 
to illuminate and prevent the bridging events via a more focused IO Camping (option 3) 
and reintegrate the moderate insiders through public discussions about the ‘national self-
defense’ (option 4). 
Disengaging moderate sympathizers from the hard-core members of the right-
wing organizations is a major objective of these efforts. In combination these non-kinetic 
options offer both long-term (institution building and communication campaign) and 




The main purpose of this study was to help the Hungarian Government positively 
identify the network of extreme right-wing self-defense organizations. Based on the 
analysis, the Hungarian self-defense groups form an intermeshed network. Under the 
umbrella of ‘national self-defense,’ the boundaries are blurred between the groups with 
different ideological bases. Their network structure provides great adaptive capability, 
steady growth, and therefore, it should not be underestimated. The Hungarian 
government should reconsider its current counter-measures and strategies against the 
right-wing groups. 
Based on the data analysis, the Hungarian government should employ a combined 
unconventional two-step (short- and long-term) campaign in order to destabilize the 
network of self-defense groups and enforce the counter-UW capabilities of the country. 
In the case of the groups that have not violated the law, the use of kinetic 
approach is very limited. As a result, in the short term, a new communication campaign 
should focus on the possible foreign ties and the danger what the network of self-defense 
groups pose to the ‘national self-defense.’ Parallel with this effort, the integrated 
employment of electronic warfare and computer network operations must monitor the 
bridging events, and track the transfers of charitable donations. 
In long term, institution building supported by a rehabilitation program must take 
place in the form of public forums. At the same time the nation’s counter-UW 
capabilities should be increased against any external threats via a mutually trusted 
institution, for instance Reserve Special Forces organized on a territorial basis, because it 
could attract moderate right-wing organizational members.  
In conclusion, the network of self-defense groups should not be considered as 
only ‘aggressive neighborhood watch’ but as an unconventional threat to national 
security. 
The analysis of political messaging of the self-defense groups and the activities of 
satellite or proxy organizations, especially the Sixty-four Counties Youth Movement’s 
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and the JOBBIK’s so-called ‘basic organizations’ abroad, exceeded the scope of this 
study. Future investigation could explore the connections at the individual level of 
analysis. Further refinement is needed to flesh out how the strategic options could be 
implemented. This study only identifies the data-driven strategies that emerge from this 
study and not how they would be executed. Finally, as more data are structured and 
analyzed, additional strategies may surface forcing a review of the recommended 
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